Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 23:31, Quentin Anciaux a écrit:

Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 16:12, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> One state consists of you alone in your room. The other state
> consists of 10^100 exact copies of you, their minds perfectly synchronised > with your mind, each copy isolated from all the others in a room just like
> yours. Whenever the light changes colour, it means that God is either
> instantaneously creating (10^100 - 1) copies, or instantaneously destroying
> all but one randomly chosen copy.
>
> Your task is to guess which colour of the light corresponds with which
> state and write it down. Then God will send you home.
>
> SNIP
>
> But just as you are about to write down your conclusion, the light changes
> to green...
>
> What's wrong with the reasoning here?

Hi Stathis,

If I was in this position, I would not even try to guess, because you (or
god :) are explaining me that it is possible to copy me (not only "me", but
really all the behavior/feelings/mental state/indoor/outdoor state copying, a
copy as good as an original or a copy cannot say which is which and even a
3rd person observer could not distinguish). If it is the case, this means
that :

1- I'm "clonable"
2- I is not "real"
3- A single "I" does not means anything

So I ask you, if it's the case (real complete copy...), why should "I" guess
anything ? Who is the "I" that must guess ?

You can only experience being one person at a time, no matter how faithful and how numerous the copies are. A simpler example than the above to demonstrate what this would be like is given by Bruno Marchal in step 3 of his UDA. You get into a teleporter in Brussels, and it transmits the information to build a copy of your body to Moscow and Washington. To a third person observing this, he notes, as you have above, that after the teleportation there is no longer a "toi", because you have become a "vous" (and not because we're being polite). For you, the effect is that you find yourself *either* in Moscow *or* Washington, each with probability 0.5. Unless you meet the other Quentin, there is no way you can tell, however many times you try this, that the machine operator hasn't flipped a coin to decide which (one) city to send you. This is rather like the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, where all possibilities are realised, so that it is a deterministic theory, but from the viewpoint of the inhabitants of any of the worlds, it is indistinguishable from the probabilistic Copenhagen interpretation.

--Stathis Papaioannou

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