Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Hal Finney writes:
> >Suppose you will again be simultaneously teleported to Washington
> >and Moscow.  This time you will have just one copy waking up in each.
> >Then you will expect 50-50 odds.  But suppose that after one hour,
> >the copy in Moscow gets switched to the parallel computer so it is
> >running with 10 times the measure; 10 copies.  And suppose that you know
> >beforehand that during that high-measure time period (after one hour)
> >in Moscow you will experience some event E.
>
> Again, it's a two step process, each time considering the next moment. 
> First, 50% chance of waking up in either Moscow or Washington. Second, 100% 
> chance of experiencing E in Moscow or 0% chance of experiencing E in 
> Washington. The timing is crucial, or the probabilities are completely 
> different.

Doesn't this approach run into problems if we start reducing the time
interval before the extra copying in Moscow?  From one hour, to one
second, to one millisecond?  At what point does your phenomenological
expectation switch over from 90% Washington to 90% Moscow?  And does
it do so discontinuously, or is there a point at which you are "just
barely" conscious enough in Moscow before the secondary duplication,
that perhaps the two probabilities balance?

I am doubtful that this approach works.

Jesse Mazer suggested backwards causation, that the secondary copying in
Moscow would influence the perceptual expectation of waking up in Moscow
even before it happens.  So he would say 90% Moscow from the beginning.
However I think that has problems if we allow amnesia to occur in Moscow
before the amplification.

I have been enjoying these discussions but unfortunately I will have to
take leave, I am going on vacation with the family for a week so I will
have little chance to participate during that time.  I'll look forward
to catching up when I return -

Hal Finney

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