Stathis wrote:
> I don't think Hal Finney was agreeing with me, I think he was pointing out how absurd my position was to lead to this conclusion! But I don't really understand your objection: are you disagreeing that your consciousness will continue as long as there is a successor OM somewhere, or are you disagreeing that there will be a successor OM somewhere if everything exists, or are you simply disagreeing that everything exists? 
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I'm disagreeing that your consciousness will "continue" as long as there is a successor OM somewhere.  You have to consider the possibility that the instances where there is a successor OM somewhere makes up a subset of measure zero of the set needed for continued consciousness, whatever that is.  Of course this even assumes that our consciousness can even jump across whatever boundaries there may be there, e.g. between universes.  And as I said before, I don't think that our identity is dependent on consciousness anyway, so I'm basically playing the devil's advocate in general when it comes to talking about the need and means of continued consciousness.  I'm thinking on a future post having to do with this, and good experiences vs. bad experiences.
Tom Caylor

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