> Bruno Marchal writes:
I will keep reading your posts hoping to make sense of it. Still I was
about asking you if you were assuming the "multiverse context" or if
you were hoping to extract (like me) the multiverse itself from the
OMs. In which case, the current answer seems still rather hard to
follow. Then in another post you just say:

> Jesse Mazer writes:
> It's a bit hard for me to come up with a satisfactory answer to this
> problem, because I don't start from the assumption of a physical
> universe at all--like Bruno, I'm trying to start from a measure on
> observer-moments and hope that somehow the appearance of a physical
> universe can be recovered from the subjective probabilities
> experienced by observers

> Bruno Marchal writes:
And this answers the question. I am glad of your  interest in the
possibility to explain the universe from OMs, but then, as I said I
don't understand how an OM could change its measure. What is clear for
me is that an OM (or preferably a 1-person, an OM being some piece of
the 1-person) can change its *relative* measure (by decision, choice,
will, etc.) of its possible next OMs.
< end quotes
 
Jesse, it seems to me that starting from a set of axioms, like the concept of a measure on observer-moments and "hope that somehow the appearance of a phyical universe can be recovered" is problematic in light of the upward and downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorems.  Taking this into account, it seems that you can't conclude anything about the cardinality of the some aspect of the universe model's domain based on a set of axioms.  I've brought up the problem of cardinalities before in the "copy method important?" thread.  I think the cardinality would have to be an assumption...
 
Tom Caylor
 

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