Tom Caylor writes:

[quoting Stathis Papaioannou]
But I don't really understand your objection: are you disagreeing that your consciousness will continue as long as there is a successor OM somewhere, or are you disagreeing that there will be a successor OM somewhere if everything exists, or are you simply disagreeing that everything exists?
< end quote

I'm disagreeing that your consciousness will "continue" as long as there is a successor OM somewhere. You have to consider the possibility that the instances where there is a successor OM somewhere makes up a subset of measure zero of the set needed for continued consciousness, whatever that is. Of course this even assumes that our consciousness can even jump across whatever boundaries there may be there, e.g. between universes. And as I said before, I don't think that our identity is dependent on consciousness anyway, so I'm basically playing the devil's advocate in general when it comes to talking about the need and means of continued consciousness. I'm thinking on a future post having to do with this, and good experiences vs. bad experiences.

I must have missed the post where you said our identity is not dependent on consciousness. How could this possibly be so? Are you suggesting that two people can be identical and yet have completely different minds, memories etc.?

As for a successor OM having measure zero, why would this not be a problem if the successor OM occurs in the same physical brain? How could it possibly make any difference if it occurred a very long way away? If someone built an Apple Mac Powerbook exactly to factory specifications, but in a billion years time in the Andromeda Galaxy, wouldn't you expect it to work exactly the same as the ones currently built by Apple? How is it even theoretically possible that a copy of you exact in every detail could be distinguished from the original?

--Stathis Papaioannou

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