Le 22-juin-05, à 20:35, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-juin-05, à 05:33, George Levy a écrit :
Note that according to this definition the set of observer states may also encompass states with inconsistent histories as long as they are indistinguishable.
The possibilities of observer moment being partially associated with (slightly) inconsistent histories resolves the question of how valid but erroneous observer moments can exist. For example I could make an arithmetical mistake such as 8*5 = 56 or I temporarily believe that Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1592.
>An interesting thought is that a psychological first person can surf simultaneously through a large number of physical OMs
With comp, we should say that the first person MUST surf simultaneously through an INFINITY of third person OMs.
I agree there is and infinity of OM's that a psychological first person surfs through. But I would not say these OM's are "third person," because there is no third person to observe them. A psychological "third person" would be too spread out among OM's to observe any one in particular.
(I would not use the term "physical" at all, because at this stage it is not defined. But with the negation of comp + assumption of slightly incorrect QM what you say seems to me plausible.)
Are you saying that COMP does not admit (slightly) inconsistent histories?
No. Quite the contrary, comp does admit inconsistent histories. But for reason of methodological simplicity, I limit my "interview of lobian machines" only on the consistent machines, for which comp makes necessary the consistency of inconsistent histories. With comp, a consistent machine is in the state of being *possibly* inconsistent.
I know you read the Smullyan's FU, and I'm afraid it is not enough. I mean it is a non trivial consequence of the incompleteness phenomenon that a consistent machine is automatically consistently inconsistent, and this in the frame of the brave and simplest logic (classical logic).
I am not sure if I agree with this. I can be a psychological first person and still say "yes doctor" to a computer transplant into my brain.
Not only I agree, but the point is that with comp it is necessarily so.