Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> >I do not equate my identity with the matter that composes my body at
> >I would say that my personal identity cannot be defined in a
> >communicable way, in the way I see it. I believe there is something
> >fundamental about consciousness.
> If you don't equate your identity with the matter of your body, then why
> would you believe that your stream of consciousness will always remain
> to the "original body" rather than one of the copies? What is special
> the original body, besides the continuity of material with the material
> made up the body before it was copied? There are many of us on this list
> also think there's something fundamental about consciousness, but most
> would say that consciousness is tied to *patterns*, not to distinct
What makes me think that way is that I cannot believe that it is dangerous
to have someone simply scan your body.
But that's just a sort of "common-sense" reaction, no? In a world where
copying was a regular occurence, people's common sense would tell them
something different, since almost everyone would have memories of being
scanned at some point and suddenly finding themselves as a copy. And if you
try to imagine what kind of *theory* of consciousness/identity you'd have to
come up with in in order for this common-sense position to be true, it seems
to me that the theory would have to say that either physical or spatial
continuity was somehow critical to determining what you'd be likely to
experience...can you think of any alternative?