Le 28-juin-05, à 17:05, chris peck wrote (quoting Kripke)

'Some philosophers think that something's having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think that it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything myself. I really don't know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking.'


I agree with Kripke. Still I believe that no "scientific communication" can refer ultimately on the intuitive content, which, even from the subject point of view is just unjustifiable. The talker must bet enough common intuition to partially justify, informally, what he has been able to make purely 3-person communicable to its collegues.

Of course we can talk on "theories *on* the first person". We can agree on axioms. The best one, in my opinion are those theories which justifies the ultimate unnameableness of the first person.

The computationnalist hypothesis (comp) in the theoretical cognitive science (alias philosophy of mind) does just that, as I show in my PhD thesis (see my url). comp can explain (meta-justify) why the ultimate evidence is "conclusive" but ineffable.

For this, I have use the modal logics of self-reference (Solovay's G and G').
Have you heard about them?

Also, do you know the paper by Hardegree which shows that quantum logic can be seen as a Lewis-Stalnaker logic of the counterfactuals?

Pardon my questioning.

Welcome to the list,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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