Le 03-juil.-05, à 05:17, chris peck a écrit :
The idea that the earth is an orb is not counter intuitive even though
the earth is flat locally. It counters no logical principles. The idea
that particles can be in more than one place at the same time is not
counter intuitive because it is a 'non local' fact - ie concerning
things that are 'unseen' - , but because 'particle' is traditionally
defined in a particular way which logically prohibits such a fact. Our
definition is at fault, our intuition is sound.
If by counter intuitive you mean "against logical principle" I would
agree with you. But I was using the term in the more general sense of
contradicting some bets we usually do from our experiences.
'Surely modern physics makes many counter intuitive,
but if you look at history you see that physicist take time to accept
Which counter intuitive idea should be accepted?
Either relatively to a theory we bet on, or simply when facts
contradicts some of our believes so that we need to update or revise
That there are infinite universes existing beyond falsification? That
possibilities collapse into actuality on being looked at (again beyond
falsification)? Both fit the equations I am led to understand. I dont
think either of these interpretations will be accepted for long.
I guess here we differ a lot and that we will need to discuss a lot.
Now, as an applied logician, I am interested in truth but I believe I
can only propose theories and interpretations of those theories. What I
am sure of is that if the computationalist hypothesis is correct in
cognitive science then the notion of universe(s) is not a primitive
one. Physical reality emerges from a measure on all possible
computations, and this is closer to many universes than just one
universe. In this list many agree that all consistent realities exist
in less demanding than accepting anyone particular reality. Then we are
confronted with the dragon problem.
I think physicists continue to hope for a classical universe
underlying and deterministically explaining quantum 'reality'.
Some physicists are, but my "poll" inquest goes in the other direction,
even if some minority try to go back to Newton. Now I don't care about
numbers of people believing something. With my work you can deduce that
newtonian physics implies the falsity of the comp hyp.
(But that is for later).
I think Quantum mechanics is the first time in the history of science
that truelly counter intuitive ideas, indeed illogical ideas, have
been presented and asked to be accepted. Unless someone can offer
I disagree, unless you mean "non classically logical" by "non logical".
'>Like in classical logic. You can prove things without constructing
But logic proves validity, not truth.
Pure logic, but not apply logic in some field. Of course at some level,
as we agree (I think), we always prove things relatively to a theory
(made explicit or not).
We shouldnt assume there is any truth about a valid argument. We can
question the premises of a valid argument, and should do so if its
conclusions are as counter intuitive as those of the DH. But which
premises are at fault?
We can reason like that, but to question the premisses, the
counter-intuitive propositions should be close to total absurdity. As I
said, most of the time "counter-intuition" is just "the intuition" of
surely its the definition of 'typical' as having birth ranks placed
at the peak of a rising population count.
Isnt the DH an epistemological argument really?. Its about what to
expect might happen rather than what will happen. I can have no reason
to say I am typical or untypical in my birth rank in this respect
untill I know what the maximum count will be, and I shouldnt therefore
use the DH to speculate about what the maximum count should be. I
should be resolutely agnostic about this.
I agree. Nevertheless I think the DA is completely convincing once we
accept some hypotheses. But all are in contradiction with both the comp
hyp, or with some finite set of physical facts (like the five
Stern-Gerlach experiment from which Julian Swinger quasi-derives the
'If the humans solve all "human problems and prevent all
risk of apocalypse, or build bunker for all citizens" then the DH
entails we will all die for an unknown reason.'
isnt there is a sense in which (in a constantly rising population)
anyone in history could formulate the DH and come to the same
conclusion, and looking back we can see their expectancy would be
wrong. Over and over again the DH would predict doom soon, yet it
never comes. Inductively then, we shouldnt accept it.
A long time ago I have made the calculation. By taking the data (human
population) from something like -125000 to 500 before C. I got a
prediction of apocalypse between 1000 and 3000 after C. taking into
account the data from -600000 to us makes just the prediction more
precise. Yet I don't believe in the apocalypse, because I don't believe
in the premisses of the DA. Nor am I sure of the population amount in
(nor to be sure the idea of absolute self-sampling among humans, why
Do you mean that we should interpret the DH so that its reference
class can contain all types of organism, and kind of maximise the
priors accordingly to temper the DH conclusion, then I think there is
something in that. But I still prefer to just intuitively shrug it
I think that is wise.
Anyhow, getting back to your papers.
Im reading 'Mechanism And Personal Identity'. Its hard. You know ive
got Perry's book on Personal Identity right here, and your paper is a
lot harder than that.
"Mechanism And Personal Identity" is not the simplest paper and is a
The amount of formal logic is a little daunting for me, are there any
I would suggest you read the step-by-step UDA in this very list. The
links can be found here
I'll maybe dig out 'Sane'.
I regret the title! But it is quite readable especially if you buy
Smullyan's "Forever Undecided" which is a nice introduction to the
logic G which axiomatizes completely (in some sense) what machine can
prove above themselves.
'Some on this list agrees
physicality could be secondary and could or should emerge from some
relative or absolute measure on the set of "Observer-Moments". '
Idealism? OMs being little bits of consciousness? If so, Im familier
with the idea, but not the dove tail argument for it.
Don't hesitate to comment it. Actually, for the first steps of the
Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA), the actual discussion, mainly
between Stathis and Lee is quite interesting. To sum up: I agree
completely with Stathis and I disagree completely with Lee :)
Next week (hopefully) I will be a little less busy and I intend to sum
up some important point made by Stathis in logical form so that people
interested will be able to see the relationship with the Godel Lob
Logic G. I will also send a post to Lee to single out some
contradiction, but I need some time. To be sure I do agree with Lee on
some important point but they are irrelevant about the measure problem
and about the fact that once we take the comp hyp seriously enough,
physics just cannot be "all there is".
'>As you see we dig deep: the primitive nature of nature is really
where Aristotle opposed himself against Plato, and since 2300 years
most follows Aristotle.
Is that the argument here? Whether matter is an emergent property or
whether it is a substrate?
'and since 2300 years most follows Aristotle.'
Who did Kant follow? Didnt he argue quite powerfully for agnosticism
Yes. But since Kant, both Physics and Logics have made important
progress. There are genuine new data.
Speak Soon hopefully.
This week I am very busy. I can still send short comments. You could
read the UDA, or even just the first steps, or just read the
Stathis/Lee discussion. The point, in a nutshell is the following: if
we are digital machine then we are duplicable. Suppose I am "read" and
"annihilated" here in Brussels, and suppose I will be reconstituted in
Washington and Moscow (say). What can I predict about my future feeling
or first person experience.
Lee says "I will soon feel to be in Washington AND I will soon feel to
be in Moscow"
Stathis says "I will soon feel to be in Washington OR I will soon feel
to be in Washington".
Given that the question does not concern my body (3-person
describable), but my mind (first person knowable), and given that, as
Stathis has repeated many times, I cannot *feel* to be at two places at
once, I find rather easy that it follows (from comp) that I must expect
to feel either in W or in M. All this, I add for Lee, Independently of
the fact that I consider my doppelganger to be "me" or not: the
question here bears on immediate first person expectations.
Looking forward to hear your comments,