Le 03-juil.-05, à 05:17, chris peck a écrit :

The idea that the earth is an orb is not counter intuitive even though the earth is flat locally. It counters no logical principles. The idea that particles can be in more than one place at the same time is not counter intuitive because it is a 'non local' fact - ie concerning things that are 'unseen' - , but because 'particle' is traditionally defined in a particular way which logically prohibits such a fact. Our definition is at fault, our intuition is sound.

If by counter intuitive you mean "against logical principle" I would agree with you. But I was using the term in the more general sense of contradicting some bets we usually do from our experiences.

'Surely modern physics makes many counter intuitive,
but if you look at history you see that physicist take time to accept them.

Which counter intuitive idea should be accepted?

Either relatively to a theory we bet on, or simply when facts contradicts some of our believes so that we need to update or revise them.

That there are infinite universes existing beyond falsification? That possibilities collapse into actuality on being looked at (again beyond falsification)? Both fit the equations I am led to understand. I dont think either of these interpretations will be accepted for long.

I guess here we differ a lot and that we will need to discuss a lot. Now, as an applied logician, I am interested in truth but I believe I can only propose theories and interpretations of those theories. What I am sure of is that if the computationalist hypothesis is correct in cognitive science then the notion of universe(s) is not a primitive one. Physical reality emerges from a measure on all possible computations, and this is closer to many universes than just one universe. In this list many agree that all consistent realities exist in less demanding than accepting anyone particular reality. Then we are confronted with the dragon problem.

I think physicists continue to hope for a classical universe underlying and deterministically explaining quantum 'reality'.

Some physicists are, but my "poll" inquest goes in the other direction, even if some minority try to go back to Newton. Now I don't care about numbers of people believing something. With my work you can deduce that newtonian physics implies the falsity of the comp hyp.
(But that is for later).

I think Quantum mechanics is the first time in the history of science that truelly counter intuitive ideas, indeed illogical ideas, have been presented and asked to be accepted. Unless someone can offer another example.

I disagree, unless you mean "non classically logical" by "non logical".

'>Like in classical logic. You can prove things without constructing

But logic proves validity, not truth.

Pure logic, but not apply logic in some field. Of course at some level, as we agree (I think), we always prove things relatively to a theory (made explicit or not).

We shouldnt assume there is any truth about a valid argument. We can question the premises of a valid argument, and should do so if its conclusions are as counter intuitive as those of the DH. But which premises are at fault?

We can reason like that, but to question the premisses, the counter-intuitive propositions should be close to total absurdity. As I said, most of the time "counter-intuition" is just "the intuition" of the other.

surely its the definition of 'typical' as having birth ranks placed at the peak of a rising population count.

Isnt the DH an epistemological argument really?. Its about what to expect might happen rather than what will happen. I can have no reason to say I am typical or untypical in my birth rank in this respect untill I know what the maximum count will be, and I shouldnt therefore use the DH to speculate about what the maximum count should be. I should be resolutely agnostic about this.

I agree. Nevertheless I think the DA is completely convincing once we accept some hypotheses. But all are in contradiction with both the comp hyp, or with some finite set of physical facts (like the five Stern-Gerlach experiment from which Julian Swinger quasi-derives the Quantum formalism).

'If the humans solve all "human problems and prevent all
risk of apocalypse, or build bunker for all citizens" then the DH entails we will all die for an unknown reason.'

isnt there is a sense in which (in a constantly rising population) anyone in history could formulate the DH and come to the same conclusion, and looking back we can see their expectancy would be wrong. Over and over again the DH would predict doom soon, yet it never comes. Inductively then, we shouldnt accept it.

A long time ago I have made the calculation. By taking the data (human population) from something like -125000 to 500 before C. I got a prediction of apocalypse between 1000 and 3000 after C. taking into account the data from -600000 to us makes just the prediction more precise. Yet I don't believe in the apocalypse, because I don't believe in the premisses of the DA. Nor am I sure of the population amount in the past.

(nor to be sure the idea of absolute self-sampling among humans, why not bacteria).

Do you mean that we should interpret the DH so that its reference class can contain all types of organism, and kind of maximise the priors accordingly to temper the DH conclusion, then I think there is something in that. But I still prefer to just intuitively shrug it off.

I think that is wise.

Anyhow, getting back to your papers.

Im reading 'Mechanism And Personal Identity'. Its hard. You know ive got Perry's book on Personal Identity right here, and your paper is a lot harder than that.

"Mechanism And Personal Identity" is not the simplest paper and is a bit old.

The amount of formal logic is a little daunting for me, are there any good summeries?

I would suggest you read the step-by-step UDA in this very list. The links can be found here

I'll maybe dig out 'Sane'.

I regret the title! But it is quite readable especially if you buy Smullyan's "Forever Undecided" which is a nice introduction to the logic G which axiomatizes completely (in some sense) what machine can prove above themselves.

'Some on this list agrees
physicality could be secondary and could or should emerge from some relative or absolute measure on the set of "Observer-Moments". '

Idealism? OMs being little bits of consciousness? If so, Im familier with the idea, but not the dove tail argument for it.

Don't hesitate to comment it. Actually, for the first steps of the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA), the actual discussion, mainly between Stathis and Lee is quite interesting. To sum up: I agree completely with Stathis and I disagree completely with Lee :) Next week (hopefully) I will be a little less busy and I intend to sum up some important point made by Stathis in logical form so that people interested will be able to see the relationship with the Godel Lob Logic G. I will also send a post to Lee to single out some contradiction, but I need some time. To be sure I do agree with Lee on some important point but they are irrelevant about the measure problem and about the fact that once we take the comp hyp seriously enough, physics just cannot be "all there is".

'>As you see we dig deep: the primitive nature of nature is really
where Aristotle opposed himself against Plato, and since 2300 years most follows Aristotle.

Is that the argument here? Whether matter is an emergent property or whether it is a substrate?

In part.

'and since 2300 years most follows Aristotle.'

Who did Kant follow? Didnt he argue quite powerfully for agnosticism here?

Yes. But since Kant, both Physics and Logics have made important progress. There are genuine new data.

Speak Soon hopefully.

This week I am very busy. I can still send short comments. You could read the UDA, or even just the first steps, or just read the Stathis/Lee discussion. The point, in a nutshell is the following: if we are digital machine then we are duplicable. Suppose I am "read" and "annihilated" here in Brussels, and suppose I will be reconstituted in Washington and Moscow (say). What can I predict about my future feeling or first person experience. Lee says "I will soon feel to be in Washington AND I will soon feel to be in Moscow" Stathis says "I will soon feel to be in Washington OR I will soon feel to be in Washington". Given that the question does not concern my body (3-person describable), but my mind (first person knowable), and given that, as Stathis has repeated many times, I cannot *feel* to be at two places at once, I find rather easy that it follows (from comp) that I must expect to feel either in W or in M. All this, I add for Lee, Independently of the fact that I consider my doppelganger to be "me" or not: the question here bears on immediate first person expectations.

Looking forward to hear your comments,



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