> The point you are making is the most convincing, and also most troubling,
> argument in support of your thesis that we should consider copies as selves.
> If I die today and then a backup copy of me that was made yesterday is run,
> this is equivalent to me losing a day of memories. If I believe that I will
> survive if I experience the memory loss, then I must also believe that I
> will survive my death if the backup is run.
> I think there is good reason to equate memory loss with death....
> Now, people lose parts of their memory all the time, and the person who
> survives the memory loss generally doesn't worry about the fate of the
> person who lost their memory...
I guess warnings should be posted in Aussie bars!
<snip even more>
> Having said all that, why have I stated in previous posts that I would agree
> to some memory loss for a sum of money? Because I will convince myself that
> I will survive it, I have seen other people apparently survive it, and I
> have apparently survived it myself in the past. So why would I not agree to
> effectively the same amount of memory loss by killing myself given that a
> backup of my mind has been made? Perhaps for the same reason that I would
> not jump out of a plane with a parachute, even if I knew that the parachute
> would work properly.
Well, most of us *could* force ourselves out that plane door.
And I am sure that you would too, for the right kind of bribe.
As you know many people who have lost memories (either medically
or through intoxication) you are convinced that in reality they
don't die. Joe is still Joe. Nobody really got killed. It's
right to talk about a little memory loss, and wrong to talk about
So my guess is that when the incentives are right, you'll talk
yourself into calling down instant vaporization on yourself so
that your frozen duplicate (of you 5 minutes ago) will get ten
million dollars. You'll just say, "oh what the hell, other people
get drunk and survive, and survive operations, so why shouldn't I?".