Le 06-juil.-05, à 07:16, Russell Standish a écrit :

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My reading of Bruno's work is that time is implicitly assumed as part of computationalism (I know Bruno sometimes does not quite agree, but there you have it).

`Thinking again on why you keep saying this, I can imagine, giving the`

`inexhaustible richness of the combination of addition and`

`multiplication in Robinson or Peano Arithmetic(*), that a case can be`

`made that I assume time. But that "time" is neither "physical time" nor`

`"psychological time" which are derived from numbers' relations.`

`So I am "just" a physicalness-deniers, by which I mean no "physical`

`things" are taken as primitive. Indeed I explain why comp makes the`

`physicalness necessarily emerging from numbers' relations.`

`The same can be said with Stephen "dualism". If it is not a "dualism"`

`of substance, then a case in favor of a dualism in comp can be made,`

`and this despite the immaterialist background.`

`We must be aware of the false difficulties brought by the need of`

`having to choose some "words", but then this is why we converse :)`

Bruno

`(*) Robinson Arithmetic (RA) is one the weakest theory of arithmetic.`

`Nevertheless it can be shown already equivalent to a Universal Machine`

`or Dovetailer.`

`Peano Arithmetic (PA) is RA + "induction axioms" is far stronger and is`

`equivalent with what I called a lobian machine.`

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/