Le 06-juil.-05, à 07:16, Russell Standish a écrit :
My reading of Bruno's work is that time
is implicitly assumed as part of computationalism (I know Bruno
sometimes does not quite agree, but there you have it).
Thinking again on why you keep saying this, I can imagine, giving the
inexhaustible richness of the combination of addition and
multiplication in Robinson or Peano Arithmetic(*), that a case can be
made that I assume time. But that "time" is neither "physical time" nor
"psychological time" which are derived from numbers' relations.
So I am "just" a physicalness-deniers, by which I mean no "physical
things" are taken as primitive. Indeed I explain why comp makes the
physicalness necessarily emerging from numbers' relations.
The same can be said with Stephen "dualism". If it is not a "dualism"
of substance, then a case in favor of a dualism in comp can be made,
and this despite the immaterialist background.
We must be aware of the false difficulties brought by the need of
having to choose some "words", but then this is why we converse :)
(*) Robinson Arithmetic (RA) is one the weakest theory of arithmetic.
Nevertheless it can be shown already equivalent to a Universal Machine
Peano Arithmetic (PA) is RA + "induction axioms" is far stronger and is
equivalent with what I called a lobian machine.