Lee Corbin wrote:
> For me, it's not that I think it's meaningful to imagine a universe just
> like ours but without causality, rather it's that I think causality is
> probably important to deciding whether a particular system in our
> counts as a valid "instantiation" of some observer-moment, and thus
> contributes to the measure of that observer-moment (which in turn
> the likelihood that I will experience that observer-moment in the
But here you use the word "system". Isn't that by definition a
process (obeying, for example, in our universe the Schrödinger
equation)? I wouldn't know, in other words, what kind of system
would *not* be a valid instantiation of an observer-moment if
it actually computed a sequence of states that emulated a person.
As long as you actually run the simulation I think it would be a valid
instantiation--but see below about why a book doesn't qualify.
> I think if you run a simulation of an observer, and record the output
> write it down in a book which you then make thousands of copies of, the
> static description in all the books most likely would not have any
> the measure of that observer, since these descriptions lack the
> "causal structure".
Yes, I'd agree. When you use the word "static" then I get the
picture. A warehouse full of stacks of paper with symbols
written on it for example. But it's not *doing* anything.
> I sort of vaguely imagine all of spacetime as an
> enormous graph showing the causal links between primitive events, with
> number of instantiations basically being the number of spots you could
> a particular sub-graph representing an observer-moment embedded in the
> entire graph; the graphs corresponding to the physical process that we
> a "book" would not have the same structure as graphs corresponding to
> physical process that we label as a simulation of a particular observer.
Here I am not sure that I am following you. Let's say somewhere in
spacetime we have a spot, as you say, where we could find a particular
sub-graph representing an observer moment. But a "book" COULD NOT
have the same kind of structure? (If the answer is yes, then I'm
Yes, I'm saying the book wouldn't have the same causal structure. There
would still be *some* sort of causal structure despite the fact that a book
looks "static" on a macro-level--the book only maintains macro-level
stability because of constant electromagnetic interactions between the atoms
that make it up--but the causal structure of the physical book wouldn't
resemble the causal structure of the simulation which is being described in
symbols on the pages of the book.