Bruno writes > I asked you to predict your immediate first person experience, not a > bird's view of the situation. This explain why if I'm in good move you > just win nothing, and if I'm in bad mood you and all the Lees own me > five dollars!
Of course, I predict that I'll have one 1st person experience at one location, and a different one at a different location. Instead of trying to trick me by doubling locations, just ask yourself the same questions beforehand by doubling times: "What do you expect, Bruno, to see?" when the situation is that every day at 9pm next week you will be shown a zero or a one. Well, you will naturally distinguish as to *when*, just as I am trying to distinguish as to *where*. But logically, you must admit that it is the same thing! > > When you then inform him that he has actually been copied and > > that there is another instance of him in the other room, then > > naturally he should say "Okay, here I am seeing a "0" and in > > the other room the opposite." > > Precisely: here I see without much doubt a 0, and I believe > intellectually, by trusting you, that another Lee see the opposite in > the other room. Do you agree it is very different sort of knowledge? > The question was concerning the first notion of knowledge. Okay, I'm glad you are making that clearer. But I think that my answer is still the same. I will be having two 1st person experiences, one in one room and another in another room. > > Here is the reason not to say that. As the person who is about > > to be duplicated knows all the facts, he is aware (from a 3rd > > person point of view) that scientifically there will be *two* > > processes both of which are very, very similar. > > Right. > > > It will be > > false that one of them will be more "him" than the other. > > Right. > > > Therefore he must identify equally with them. Therefore, > > it is wrong to imply that he "I" will be one of them but not > > the other of them. > > This is a matter of choice and personal opinion. It does not address > the question I asked. The question is not who you will be, but what > will be your immediate feeling. Given that we assume comp it is easy to > predict that you will either see 0 or see 1. You will not see a zero > blurred with a one. You can in advance bet you will see only a zero > (resp. one), and just intellectually know some "other you" will see a > one (resp. zero). > > But if you answer "I will see 0 on the wall OR I will see 1 on the > > wall" > > then it makes it sound as though one of those cases will obtain but > > not the other. > > Actually I was using the non-exclusive OR! But I do think that the > first person experiences of seeing 1 and 0 *are* indeed alternative > experience. After one duplication, those experience will be exclusive > of each other. You are not able to know the experience of the > doppelganger in the same sense that you will be able to see directly > the output on the wall. That's right, of course. If you are speaking of what an instance knows. > You shift from 1-person to 3-person, when the question is a bet, before > the duplication, of the immediate first person experience. > > But you know, before the duplication that all the Lee will have > alternate experiences. So I really don't understand you bet. > Mathematically your bets make you win 0 dollars. By betting on your > ignorance (1 OR 0), you will always be confirmed and you win 5 dollars > at each duplication. You and all the Lee. It seems to me you are hard > with your (first person) selves. What do you think about reworking your whole challenge with *time* instead of *place*? Especially if we allow memory to be erased. Same thing. Lee