Le 12-juil.-05, à 04:07, Lee Corbin a écrit :

Bruno writes

I asked you to predict your immediate first person experience, not a
bird's view of the situation. This explain why if I'm in good move you
just win nothing, and if I'm in bad mood you and all the Lees own me
five dollars!

Of course, I predict that I'll have one 1st person experience
at one location, and a different one at a different location.

And so you agree you will win the dollars by predicting you will have one or the other experiences. But this is really all what is necessary for progressing in the reasoning I propose and which shows the comp hyp being enough non trivial as to makes physics secondary to computer science. And this in a way shared by many on this list which is that reality could emerge from some ASSA, or other RSSA statistics on "observer-moments".

Instead of trying to trick me by doubling locations, just ask
yourself the same questions beforehand by doubling times:
"What do you expect, Bruno, to see?"  when the situation is
that every day at 9pm next week you will be shown a zero or
a one.

Well, you will naturally distinguish as to *when*, just as I
am trying to distinguish as to *where*.  But logically, you
must admit that it is the same thing!

OK. (if I understand, but i don't see the point).

When you then inform him that he has actually been copied and
that there is another instance of him in the other room, then
naturally he should say "Okay, here I am seeing a "0" and in
the other room the opposite."

Precisely: here I see without much doubt a 0, and I believe
intellectually, by trusting you, that another Lee see the opposite in
the other room. Do you agree it is very different sort of knowledge?
The question was concerning the first notion of knowledge.

Okay, I'm glad you are making that clearer.  But I think
that my answer is still the same.  I will be having two
1st person experiences, one in one room and another in
another room.

Be careful (remember my mood). Actually this statement is rather clear. But you are still describing a third person view on ... your future first person view. Now I have no problem with that because you are just giving me some work to do. Indeed I can derive from your statement that you will accept the following more precise description. "I will be having two 1st person experiences confirming my "0 v 1" bet, one with 0 and the other one with 1. I have been wise not to predict "0 & 1" because the 0/1 are put for first person experience (as asked in the question) and both duplicates lives alternatives experiences.

All right? If you agree, you grasp the notion of first person comp indeterminacy. (and if you want we can proceed; but even at this stage I think just a little bit of modal logic could help, I have a growing post on that).

What do you think about reworking your whole challenge
with *time* instead of *place*?   Especially if we allow
memory to be erased.  Same thing.

Because I intend to derive "time" and space from the computation done by the UD. The "place" will belongs in a infinite set of UD-generated computations. Now about "erasing memory", as I said to George Levy a long time ago, I find them a little bit premature and dangerous (giving the very high counter-intuitiveness of the subject already without memory erasure). But they are quite important because their are probably the best comp candidate to fuse computations and histories.



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