Le 13-juil.-05, à 01:01, Charles Goodwin a écrit :

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From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:Fabric-of- [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Lee Corbin I don't know what you even *mean* by "QS does not reduce the number of worlds you experience", unless you mean that nothing that I can do affects the number of worlds I can experience. (And I will not discuss free will vs. determinism.)I *think* what this means is based on the QTI rule (or theorem orwhatever)that *all* observer-moments have continuers. But I could be wrong.

`It *is* a delicate matter. Recently Stathis Papaioannou, on the`

`everything-list, has made a theory where "to be in an alive state" is`

`represented by an observer-moment having at least one continuer (or`

`successor as he called them).`

`"to be (absolutely) dead" is represented by an observer-moment having`

`no successor (so that: to be dead = not to be alive, which is rather`

`natural for a platonist).`

`And at some point in a reasoning Stathis said that we die at each`

`instant.`

`This gives a theory where all transient (alive) observer moments have a`

`cul-de-sac successor. Of course an observer moment could have more than`

`one successor and some successor can be transient. In Stathis theory,`

`at first sight, to be immortal would consist in being forever in the`

`state of being able to die!`

`Now the problem with such a theory where there are cul-de-sac worlds`

`"everywhere" (I mean "accessible from all transient worlds") is that it`

`can be shown that there is no available notion of (relative)`

`probability bearing on accessible observer moments.`

`Probabilities reappears when we explicitly make abstraction of the`

`cul-de-sac worlds or observer-moments. It is the implicit default`

`assumption of probability: if you throw a dice you will not say the`

`probability of getting 6 is 1/7 giving that the possible results would`

`be getting 1, getting 2, getting 3, ... , getting 6, and dying!`

`Doing that abstraction changes the logic, and changes the possible`

`structure on the set of OMs.`

`With comp such a change logic can be justified logically once we`

`distinguish provability and truth, that is by taking into account`

`explicitly the incompleteness phenomenon. It is hard to say more`

`without being a tiny bit more technical. I will explain more on the`

`everything list.`

`The point is that quantum immortality or the more general (and older)`

`comp-immortality is *provably* a personal opinion bearing on first`

`person notions. But that is the case with any assertion that some`

`theory are *true*.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/