# Re: Quantum Suicide Bombing

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Le 13-juil.-05, à 01:01, Charles Goodwin a écrit :```
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```From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:Fabric-of-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Lee Corbin

I don't know what you even *mean* by "QS does not reduce the number
of worlds you experience", unless you mean that nothing that I can
do affects the number of worlds I can experience. (And I will not
discuss free will vs. determinism.)
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I *think* what this means is based on the QTI rule (or theorem or whatever)
```that *all* observer-moments have continuers. But I could be wrong.
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It *is* a delicate matter. Recently Stathis Papaioannou, on the everything-list, has made a theory where "to be in an alive state" is represented by an observer-moment having at least one continuer (or successor as he called them). "to be (absolutely) dead" is represented by an observer-moment having no successor (so that: to be dead = not to be alive, which is rather natural for a platonist). And at some point in a reasoning Stathis said that we die at each instant. This gives a theory where all transient (alive) observer moments have a cul-de-sac successor. Of course an observer moment could have more than one successor and some successor can be transient. In Stathis theory, at first sight, to be immortal would consist in being forever in the state of being able to die!
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Now the problem with such a theory where there are cul-de-sac worlds "everywhere" (I mean "accessible from all transient worlds") is that it can be shown that there is no available notion of (relative) probability bearing on accessible observer moments.
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Probabilities reappears when we explicitly make abstraction of the cul-de-sac worlds or observer-moments. It is the implicit default assumption of probability: if you throw a dice you will not say the probability of getting 6 is 1/7 giving that the possible results would be getting 1, getting 2, getting 3, ... , getting 6, and dying!
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Doing that abstraction changes the logic, and changes the possible structure on the set of OMs. With comp such a change logic can be justified logically once we distinguish provability and truth, that is by taking into account explicitly the incompleteness phenomenon. It is hard to say more without being a tiny bit more technical. I will explain more on the everything list. The point is that quantum immortality or the more general (and older) comp-immortality is *provably* a personal opinion bearing on first person notions. But that is the case with any assertion that some theory are *true*.
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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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