Hi Imo,
I'd concur with Bruno in 'nice try'. I have lost count of the number of times I 
have seen someone dive in with a proclaimation like yours. I include myself in 
this :P
My reacent outburst is an example!

I can only encourage you to follow your ideaS and poke every eye you see. A bit 
of Feyerabendian anarchy and chaos is a wonderful part of the discourse on the 
way to the real answer.

I can give you a hint as to how to evaluate your ideas. Put it to the following 

If I _built_ a machine that followed my metaphor, 

a) would it necessarily have a knowledge model based on it's own determination 
due to experience of the world, or what I bestow on it?
b) would it have a phenomenal consciousness? If not, why not? If so why so? Is 
it important or not to have a pheneomenal consciousness?

As wondeful example is to apply the same logic to Gerald Edelman's model in

Edelman, G. 2003. 'Naturalizing consciousness: A theoretical framework', Proc 
Natl Acad Sci U S A, 100 

Wonderful metaphor. Build one....would it necessarily be conscious (have a 
phenomenal consciousness)?

Don't be too fussed about Bruno's 'contradiction to COMP HYP'. It's only a 
hypothesis! For the same reasons given above. No matter what level of 
mathematical cogency exists, the maths _does not exist_ and a machine acting 
like it exists is no substitute unless something that does exist is there to 
acknowledge it and understand it. The mathematics appears to have 1st person 
handled but it doesn't because nothing is actually reified. Puting a bunch of 
symbols in a computer substrate does not reify anything.

This is a wonderful fire we all dance around. It looks so different to each 
observer. It's what makes it such a stimulating topic.


Colin Hales

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