Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a Realist
accept that "a wholly independent world "out there" exists and existed
before he did" and yet can admit that the particular properties of this
"independent world" are not *definite* prior to the specification of a
particular observational context?
I am claiming that we should not conflate *existence* with *property
----- Original Message -----
From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "EverythingList" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 11:28 PM
Subject: RE: subjective reality
The realist does *not* want the world to be "as it seems to be". No,
the realist focuses on the fact that a wholly independent world "out
there" exists and existed before he did. In fact, it is the subjectivists
who start calling their own unassailable introspections "reality".