Hi Bruno,

----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <everything-list@eskimo.com>
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 11:06 AM
Subject: Re: YD is the driving motor of the Everett "interpretation" of QM?

On 23 Aug 2005, at 18:08, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Bruno,

How is this the case? YD requires that the mind, or some token of subjective awareness, can be faithfully represented in terms of TM,

I could agree, despite some ambiguity. (In particular no first person can *construct* such an association, it is why YD asks for a bet).


Why does this "bet" remind me of Pascal's Wager? This is the main source of my irritation with your thesis, it ask me to believe some postulate without even a hope that it can be proven. (This is not about your *proof* that a machine is unable to *know* what it's program is. That is easy to derive from the idea that a map can not be created of a dynamic territory that includes a copy of the map... I accept your idea here without trepidation.) Being raised by Fundamentalist parents has something to do with this "allergy" of mine. Please do not take this personally, but you must admit that there is a lot at stake in this bet!

or some other equivalent that can be implemented in a finite number of steps in a physically realizable machine.

No. YD does not presuppose the existence of any "physically realizable machine".


Ok, then what connects the idea of YD to the real world possibility of uploading my subjective sense of self into a blinking and whirring cube of silicon?

It is my belief that such TM are equivalent to Boolean algebras which have been proven to not be able to faithfully represent any QM system having more than 2 dimensions.

OK, but YD asks only that the mind can be implemented in some (classical or quantum) digital machine. And we know that all digital machine (classical or quantum) can be runned on a classical (and immaterial) Turing machine.


That tears it! I can accept a computational system that does not have a "where" or "there" assosiated with it, but I am being asked to accept an "immaterial" one? Ok, I will let that slide, but I really need to understand your insistence that the "Machina sans corpus" be a "classical machine"? A quantum machine can do far more exponentially faster, so why the insistence? Can we safely assume that we all agree that the Multiverse is Quantum Mechanical at its primal core? All the computation you might want can be found in its Unitary evolution, but wait, that idea requres a notion of time. Oh no! ;-)

A QM system, or more to the point here, its logical equivalent can embed at least one Complete Boolean Algebra. The converse is not possible exept for the trivial case.

That is true for embedding which preserves truth values and some algebraic structure, but not for more general form of embedding. In any case it is not relevant for the discussion given that YD asks only for your (classical or quantum) state to be implemented in some turing machine.


Your point is well taken so long as one assumes that no aspect of consciousness requires QM aspects, such as entanglement and quantum statistics (Bose, Fermi, etc.). I am still waiting patiently for something that looks like a derivation of QM's wierdness from Classical logics.

Unless the Multiverse is restricted to 2 dimensions, how does your claim *not* fall apart?

I really don't see why. Are you saying here that, unlike Godfrey, you think YD is incompatible with even QM without collapse?


"Incompatible"? Wrong choice of word. Whether or not collapse occurs is contriversial but we can hope for empirical evidence to deside one way or another. YD takes that hope away and gives me "evidence of things not seen" instead. No thanks. ;-)

Bruno, you can do better than this! Please understand that I would very much like your theory to be true (it is beautiful!), but will not let my desire over come my need for falsifiabilty. (back off, Chris Peck!)



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