Before I disappear back into the eeeeeeeuw enteric neuroscience PhD life….again…

In is: 
“Fundamental Physics: I define it by the correct-by-definition discourse about 
observable and verifiable anticipation of possible relatively evolving 
quantities and/or qualities.”

Do you see the assumption here? It assumes that models derived from 
experiential qualities (=empiricism) necessarily capture those processes of the 
natural world that generate the experiential qualities used to be empirical. 
This is simply a belief. Yes the universe may behave in the way characterised 
–as you say – by ‘definition’. They are tautologous. To assume that these are 
‘fundamental’ is to make the whole definition an oxymoron! The ‘fundamental 
laws’ that responsible for experiential qualities and the laws obtained by 
USING those experiential qualities to do observation cannot logically be 
claimed to be the same set! No useful outcome can be acquired from this 

To make any sense at all of the words ‘first-person’ you have to have some sort 
of definition of what that is. I don’t think there is any real definition of 
that anywhere in QM or UD or YD or any of the other models discussed here. 
There is an assumption that the idea of a ‘third person’ perspective and ‘third 
person experience’. These I think are both an oxymoron like military 
intelligence. J  This is another assumption deriving from the idea that first 
person perspective is an any way captured by QM or a COMP machine. Not shown, 
not justified…

Third and finally
COMP can be found to be false as follows:
In there is, 
on page 10, the following statement: “It can be seen as a manner to emulate 
digital parallelism in a linear sequential way.”

According to your own document the UD is an enormous serial proof machine. It 
_assumes_ that the very act of being such a machine somehow preserves all the 
characteristics of what it is describing. This is simply untrue. 

Two turing machines A and B working in lockstep actually do 3 ‘computations’ or 
‘proofs’: machine A proof Ta, machine B proof Tb and C) the ‘relative’ proof 
Tab (and Tba) between machines A and B....Equally true, but not literally 
proven by the two machines. These are virtual theorems that precisely fit the 
classification of Gödellian ‘unprovable truths’ (which, I hereby claim priority 
as discoverer). Russel has my paper on them.

The UD has Ta in it.
The UD has Tb in it.
The UD does not have Tab or Tba
In order that Tba/Tab be excluded in the UD you have to assume they are not 
relevant to subjective experience. If Tba and Tab are recognised at all they 
are certinly not included in the UD by defintion of the serial execution. Nor 
are they proven eliminable from the UD (=unimportant). 

Tba and Tab are IMPLICIT proofs = virtual theorems that are only present in 
inherently parallel systems. Ergo it is simply an erroneous basis to start any 
model of the natural world and especially erroneous if it has anything to say 
about subjective experience, which, if it is anything at all is NOT about what 
a thing IS, but is about what a thing IS NOT. When you explicitly define any 
‘thing’ you implicitly define NOT THING! Any computationalist approach 
formulates seriality and disposes of all the virtual theorems! No amount of 
wishful computing will reinstate them! You have to BE PARALLEL to get them.

Alternatively you can prove conclusively prove that they are not in the 
universe….woops…you will then prove all Feynman diagrams to be false…(virtual 
theorems = virtual matter) …and….I can find a mechanism whereby the human brain 
makes very good use of virtual theorems.

So “what is it like to be a UD?”
It’s like being a whopping great fat Turing machine = like being a tape reader 
and tape: probably nothing at all, but certainly different from whatever the UD 
thinks it is emulating! What’s it like to be a computer based on silicon? Like 
being a hot rock? What’s it like to be a quantum computer? Like being a 
cryogenically cold rock. :)

Finally: This is development of Progoginian thinking. The two people on this 
list who seem to be getting nearest to it are Stephen Paul King and Hal Ruhl.

Can we please move on? The universe is absolutely bristling with virtual 
theorems. There are no theories of everything here… but merely ‘theories of not 
much at all’!

Experiential qualities are not in the UD. All human knowledge is symbolically 
grounded in experiential qualities (a la Harnad). ergo... 

Bye bye COMP.


Colin Hales

From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 1:19 AM
Subject: Re: Kaboom

On 24 Aug 2005, at 02:45, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

I can't even get past the axioms of COMP. They just don’t hold unless I delude 
myself that the universe is driven by some mechanism implementing the 
underlying 'ruleness' we observe.

I don't think so at all. If comp is true then there is no primitive Universe at 
all, and observable reality is, a priori, not computable (I mean 
turing-emulable). This is obvious if you follow the Universal Dovetailer 
Argument, so I will not explain, and I will just refer you to my URL). 

Understanding consciousness is my goal and playing around with human generated 
symbols symbols seems to be diverting good thinking away from the thing that is 
actually responsible for consciousness - the natural world.

Only if comp is false, but that is coherent with what you say above. Indeed 
with comp you need to explain the belief in a "natural world" from an average 
of machine first person point of view. Good for me because I am searching what 
the "natural world" is and where it comes from.


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