On 30 Aug 2005, at 05:53, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But I don't pretend multiverse explains something. Neither the existence of a universe or a multiverse is assumed.
I respect this.
As Russell point out to Godfrey, it is important to distinguish sort of constructive physicalism a-la-Schmidhuber, where the physical universe is a computational object and comp where there is no physical universe at all. from this I can conclude you are not reading the posts (still less my papers), and you are fighting an idea you have build from comp.
This is done. Comp explains a lot of things about the nature of the first person including role of consciousness, correct feeling of ineffability, impossibility to recognize itself into any third person description, relation with intuitionism and Brouwer's theory of consciousness, etc...
This is done. In particular brain material and all material cannot be captured by a classical logic, but by a quantum logic.
Mmhhh... It looks like the new fashion in town, I mean the list, consists to criticize text without reading it. I thought naively that this was only a Belgium specialty!
Please Colin, I respect your theory, and if you believe there is a primitive natural world, then by criticizing comp you are with me, logically. Comp is just (epistemologically) incompatible with the belief in a primary physical reality. If you are interested in that result, I propose you to follow the reasoning step by step.
- Re: Kaboom Bruno Marchal
- Re: Kaboom kurtleegod
- Computationalism vs. Comp Lee Corbin