[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality


On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I have concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two of your premises (CT & AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, though they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that "one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a "digital computer" without prejudice to that experience". Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to your derivation of the *whole of physics* you cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also aware of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis, in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish such replacement (which I assume might involve some
physical interventions).

YD is certainly speculative, but there is considerable evidence that human experience is an epiphenomena of brain activity - from which is follows that YD is possible. So far as I know there is nothing in QM that contradicts it. In fact Tegmark and others have shown that the operation of the human brain must be almost completely classical. So for YD to be inconsistent with physics it would have to inconsistent with classical physics.

Why do you think YD is inconsistent with QM?

Brent Meeker


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