Hi Lee, Thanks for the 'ism clarification and for reminding me of my days on the extropy list!
In my case the situation is a little more complex for me than simply boxing myself into a single 'ism. I suppose I cannot claim COMP is 100% falsified for it (computationalism) has a role in my model. Functionalism also can be seen. I can also see phenomenalism. The computing in the model is, in effect, connectionism mediated by/grounded in phenomenalism. The thing is reductionist as well (the lower layers). The two-sided knowledge model system has a sort of mysterianism in it (asymptotic unknowability). In the creation of an entire perceptual field process there is emergentism or could it be epiphenomeinalism? There is also a form of pan-psychism (the all-pervasive godellian unproven truths/virtual theorems). It's a monism(the whole thing is made of one single fluctuation type). It could also be called an anomalous monism because the monism produces virtual matter. So it could also be called a virtual dualism. The knowledge model could also be seen as naturalism or perhaps ! a naturalistic physicalism (materialism). The model is definitely not literal property or substance dualism. The model is best thought of as a hybrid of a form of objectivism on one side (providing a description/appearance) and a form of rationalism on the other (providing causal necessity); both sides are empirically accessible through phenomenal consciousness. The only definite exclusion is eliminativism. As to realism, idealism, conceptualism, nominalism, instrumentalism, constructivism, determinism...... eeek lemme outta here! I wouldn’t have a model if I was required to fit the entire thing into a single philosophical 'ism. None of the 'isms suggested anything that lead to the model. The real world did that. The model takes on different philosophical appearances at different spatiotemporal scales and across structure/function. What I can firmly support is the idea that any single 'ism is not 'the' answer. As for uploading? Notwithstanding significant issues to do with massive amounts of brain function to do with physiology that will simply not be needed in the new substrate, basically the model I propose will enable it. Indeed the proof of concept will happen when the prototype chips get made. The chips will also enable the virtual world that the uploaded could inhabit. All kinda weird, huh? Uploading will need fantastic imaging to get at the details of the uploaded's brain (it'll need to be able to resolve individual ion channels, all synaptic connections and other stuff currently only visible in-vitro with electron microscopy). Also there will be a massive shock as the regulatory mechanisms re-tune. A whole raft of practical reasons for it being very tricky. But in principle? Seems doable. When the chips are made and scaled up enough. And the reverse: stick the chips in your brain. That should be possible too. Fix up/augment brain function. The chips will be able to cohere with brain EM patterns well enough to integrate into the 'unity' of it. Power supply is an issue, though. So me claiming COMP is kaput is a bit over the top: I'm proposing that it's just only part of the picture, not all of the picture. And I'm suggesting what the rest of the picture may be. The model is 10 layers deep. Virtual theorems are the mathematical basis for the phenomenal aspect only! Layer 0. I promised myself I'd stop this! Enough already! Cheers, colin > > > > > I find an assumption of COMP far more tenuous than an assumption of a > natural world > > > > I respect this. > > I think that there has been a good deal of confusion between > > (I) computationalism: the doctrine that robots running classical > programs can be conscious > > (II) Bruno's theories which build on this long-standing belief > (computationalism) and which go much further. > > This confusion has not been helped at all by Bruno continuing to > use the term "comp" indiscriminately for both computationalism > (which is also basically "functionalism") and his valiant attempts > to derive his "comp" from computationalism (involving use of Gödel's > Theorem, etc.) > > It must be added that I have *never* --- since 1965 when I argued > for (what I didn't know was called) computationalism against others > in my high school. > > It must also be stressed that Turing's most famous essay embraced > what is today called *computationalism* and which---basically--- > was called functionalism in the 1980's and 1990's. > > The YD (Bruno's rather picturesque way of describing uploading) > has also been argued about---especially by cryonicists---for over > twenty-five years. When I first became a acquainted with it, we > all called it "downloading": the notion that one's consciousness > could be downloaded into a piece of silicon, with all the advantages > of speed, durability, and backup capabilities that this entails. > > In 1989 or so the people that I hang out with began to call this > "uploading" instead. You'll have no trouble with Google finding > all the thousands of emails and papers written about uploading. > The name was changed when it was realized that "downloading" oneself > into a small or large silicon device had many disadvantages over > "uploading" one's self into distributed, possibly Solar System wide, > communications nets. > > TO BE SURE: the main point of contention among people is still whether > functionalism is true. Is it true, in other words, that "if it sounds > like a duck, walks like a duck, and acts in every way like a duck, then > it's a duck!"? We who say *yes* to computationalism and functionalism > are not in the same camp, as Stephen Paul King points out, as a number > of notable theorists like Roger Penrose, who believe in their bones > that there has to be a connection between quantum mechanics and > consciousness. > > On the contrary, people who dismiss functionalism (computationalism) > will hopefully realize their mistake before long if (when) robots > attain the same behavioral capabilities that humans have. On the other > hand, if this proves to be truly impossible without quantum computation, > then we computationalists will have to admit that we were wrong. > > Lee
