Lee and others: 

I was surprised to see your remark that
functional(ism) and computational(ism) are in the same
camp (comp?). I treat (my) functions vaguely, leave it
to "nature" to invent (use?) whatever she can while
all comp-related isms are applicable within human
logic. At least said to be approachable. I consider
ourselves a tiny segment of 'everything' and would not
denigrate the totality to our choices. (I am no
solipsist rather a not-so-naive realist without a
reality to show).

John Mikes

PS: I heard your 'duck' argument already, and agreed,
untill I realized that it is valid only on (and
within) a "duck" model we construed for a 'duck'. Move
the boundaries (or just widen them) to include a more
comprehensive view and your 'ducky' will include
characteristics beyond those you mentioned. JM

--- Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Bruno writes
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > > I find an assumption of COMP far more tenuous
> than an assumption of a natural world
> >
> > I respect this.
> I think that there has been a good deal of confusion
> between
> (I)  computationalism: the doctrine that robots
> running classical
>      programs can be conscious
> (II) Bruno's theories which build on this
> long-standing belief
>      (computationalism) and which go much further.
> This confusion has not been helped at all by Bruno
> continuing to
> use the term "comp" indiscriminately for both
> computationalism
> (which is also basically "functionalism") and his
> valiant attempts
> to derive his "comp" from computationalism
> (involving use of Gödel's
> Theorem, etc.)
> It must be added that I have *never* --- since 1965
> when I argued
> for (what I didn't know was called) computationalism
> against others
> in my high school.
> It must also be stressed that Turing's most famous
> essay embraced
> what is today called *computationalism* and
> which---basically---
> was called functionalism in the 1980's and 1990's.
> TO BE SURE: the main point of contention among
> people is still whether
> functionalism is true.  Is it true, in other words,
> that "if it sounds
> like a duck, walks like a duck, and acts in every
> way like a duck, then
> it's a duck!"? 
> Lee

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