On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:55, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (GK, Godfrey) wrote:
As Russell point out to Godfrey, it is important to distinguish
sort of constructive physicalism a-la-Schmidhuber, where the
physical universe is a computational object and comp where there is
no physical universe at all. from this I can conclude you are not
reading the posts (still less my papers), and you are fighting an
idea you have build from comp.
Since you referred me to John Preskill's delightful lectures on
quantum computation I figured I may quote you a little jewel
I found in there which, though obviously mistaken in terminology,
is quite relevant to this point and others you have raised.
About the Measurement Problem (chapt3, pg.50) Preskill points out
that "There are at least two schools of thought:
"Platonic": Physics describes reality. In quantum theory "the wave
function of the universe" is a complete description
of physical reality"
"Positivist": Physics describes our perceptions. The wave function
encodes our state of knowledge, and the task of
quantum theory is to make the best possible predictions about the
future, given our current state of knowledge. "
The he goes on to defend his choice of the first school:
"I believe in reality. My reason, I think, is a pragmatic one. As
a physicist I seek the most economical model that
explains what I perceive. etc..." (you can read the rest...)
Platonists and positivists would certainly scream at this
description of their views but I think
it shows is that even the staunchest defenders of the Everett
interpretation think that by embracing it they
are embracing "reality" by which they mean the Physical Reality
that, you claim, does not exist ! To me this
suggests again that you have a very crooked view of MWI if you
think it supports you in any way...
Of course, Everett still postulates EQM, and interpret it in a
physicalist way. I have clear that I don't follow him in the sense
that, once comp is assumed, my theorem shows that SWE is either
redundant or false.
Now I am a realist. reality is independent of me, but with comp it
just cannot be "physical", unless you redefined "physical" by
"observable", but then you need a theory of observation, which is
what comp provides freely (with and without YD); and then the
physical emerges "logically" from the number theoretical true relations.