(New Brunswick, NJ)
From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; email@example.com
Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 14:55:07 +0200
Subject: Re: Kaboom
On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:55, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (GK, Godfrey) wrote:
> As Russell point out to Godfrey, it is important to distinguish >
sort of constructive physicalism a-la-Schmidhuber, where the > physical
universe is a computational object and comp where there is > no
physical universe at all. from this I can conclude you are not >
reading the posts (still less my papers), and you are fighting an >
idea you have build from comp.
> Since you referred me to John Preskill's delightful lectures on >
quantum computation I figured I may quote you a little jewel
> I found in there which, though obviously mistaken in terminology, >
is quite relevant to this point and others you have raised.
> About the Measurement Problem (chapt3, pg.50) Preskill points out >
that "There are at least two schools of thought:
> "Platonic": Physics describes reality. In quantum theory "the wave >
function of the universe" is a complete description
> of physical reality"
> "Positivist": Physics describes our perceptions. The wave function >
encodes our state of knowledge, and the task of
> quantum theory is to make the best possible predictions about the >
future, given our current state of knowledge. "
> The he goes on to defend his choice of the first school:
> "I believe in reality. My reason, I think, is a pragmatic one. As >
a physicist I seek the most economical model that
> explains what I perceive. etc..." (you can read the rest...)
> Platonists and positivists would certainly scream at this >
description of their views but I think
> it shows is that even the staunchest defenders of the Everett >
interpretation think that by embracing it they
> are embracing "reality" by which they mean the Physical Reality >
that, you claim, does not exist ! To me this
> suggests again that you have a very crooked view of MWI if you >
think it supports you in any way...
Of course, Everett still postulates EQM, and interpret it in a
physicalist way. I have clear that I don't follow him in the sense
that, once comp is assumed, my theorem shows that SWE is either
redundant or false.
Now I am a realist. reality is independent of me, but with comp it
just cannot be "physical", unless you redefined "physical" by
"observable", but then you need a theory of observation, which is what
comp provides freely (with and without YD); and then the physical
emerges "logically" from the number theoretical true relations.
Here you lost me again! So you are convinced that QM even in the EQM
format is false or redundant!? But yet you insist
that its observable consequences can be derived from the same theory
(theorem) that proves it false!!! Seems to me
that by Preskill's terms you start out as a realist only to end up
back in Copenhagen!! Is that it?
Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and
industry-leading spam and email virus protection.