On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

[BM]

 Of course, Everett still postulates EQM, and interpret it in a physicalist way. I have clear that I don't follow him in the sense that, once comp is assumed, my theorem shows that SWE is either redundant or false.

 Now I am a realist. reality is independent of me, but with comp it just cannot be "physical", unless you redefined "physical" by "observable", but then you need a theory of observation, which is what comp provides freely (with and without YD); and then the physical emerges "logically" from the number theoretical true relations.


Bruno


[GK]

 Here you lost me again! So you are convinced that QM even in the EQM format is false or redundant!?



False? I don't know. But if EQM is true then it is certainly redundant, given that the whole of physics (unlike geography) is, [assuming comp (and the correctness of the derivation, but this is assumed by default: it has been verified by many people)], derivable from computer science.




But yet you insist

 that its observable consequences can be derived from the same theory (theorem) that proves it false!!! Seems to me

 that by Preskill's terms you start out as a realist only to end up back in Copenhagen!! Is that it?



False and redundant have not the same meaning!  I insist only that its (QM) observable consequences (in case QM gives correct prediction) can be derived from the same theory (comp) that proves it redundant (not false). Or that proves it false if QM is indeed false.

Given that the MANY-WORLD, in the form of many (immaterial!) computational histories, is the most easier feature of reality to derive from comp i doubt we could be lead to Copenhagen. Strictly speaking this could logically happen, and i have since 5 years a curious argument which shows that even with comp some branches selection mechanism could exist. This is well beyond my thesis and is related on Riemann Hypothesis and the primes distribution, but at this stage it is out-of topics, to say the least.

All what I say, Godfrey, is that if comp is correct, physics is a secondary science. Physics is "reduced" to the study of gluable or recollable pieces of consistent machine dreams. And those terms are easy to define in computer science (assuming comp of course), and this makes the comp hyp testable, by comparing the comp-phys with the usual phys.

Bruno


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