Stephen, 

without any 'implication' to 'logic' (I leave that to
Bruno) my theoretical disapproval for the term 'cause'

coming from the (reductionist?) view of our physical
(both verbally and scientifically meant) universe: we
have a model with boundaries (my distinction, I hope
in congruence with Hal's lexicon) and we search for
the "most obvious" originator for an event WITHIN
those boundaries (within any of our models we
consider). 

My wholistic view of 'complexity' acknowledges the
interconnection of 'them all', our model is connected
to extraneous (beyond boundary) factors as well with
effects (and responses) whether we recognize them or
not. So to "pick" a cause may please the order, but is
incomplete at least. The origination of the cumulative
changes of nature cannot be restricted to any (maybe
in our restricted observation: the most ostentatious)
single "cause". 

I 'feel' (I am far from having studied it in any
depth) that the "3rd kind" is close to my vision,
except for the connotation of the (in my views)
restricted QM-related Multiverse and explanations from
the model-view physics (Q or class).  

I would keep away from the use of 'teleological'.

Best regards to Marc and you

John Mikes


--- Stephen Paul King <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Dear Marc,
> 
>     Is this proposed third kind of cause similar to
> the notion of Implication in logic?
> 
> Kindest regards,
> 
> Stephen
>   ----- Original Message ----- 
>   From: Marc Geddes 
>   To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
>   Sent: Monday, September 19, 2005 4:36 AM
>   Subject: Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
> 
> 
> 
>   Yes, my first proposed kind of causation is indeed
> the usual physics kind of causation.
> 
>   I'm not sure that you understood my second
> proposed kind of causation - a  choice made by a
> teleological agent (like humans) which affects the
> teleology (process of moving towards one's goals) of
> other agents.  This is not  'downward causation' or
> 'efficient causation' as far as I can tell. 
> 
>   My third proposed kind of causation is highly
> abstract in nature and hard to explain.  It involves
> the structure of the Multiverse (patterns across
> multiple QM branches).  A sort of 'Platonic' cause
> tying different kinds of knowledge together - i.e
> establishing a logical 'direction' for complexity.
>    
>   On 9/19/05, Russell Standish
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: 
>     OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used
> in Physics, or material
>     cause. The second is sometimes known as downward
> causation, or 
>     efficient causation. The third one, though I'm
> struggling with. Is it
>     the same as my "circular causation", sort of
> first and final casuation
>     rolled into one?
> 
>     Cheers
> 

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