Its a different mode of description. Physics does not describe the
subjective state. Also, causation no. 2 appears to work in the
opposite direction to causation no. 1.


On Mon, Sep 19, 2005 at 06:01:45PM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote:
> On Sep 19, 2005, at 1:00 AM, Marc Geddes wrote:
> >Here's a speculation:
> >
> >The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3  
> >different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'.
> >
> >The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects  
> >through space.
> >The second is mental causality   - agents making choices which  
> >effect agents
> >The  third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly  
> >abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/ 
> >consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain  
> >ordered 'structure' to it .
> >
> >Anyone have any thoughts on this?
> >
> Here's my thought -- isn't it the case that we know enough about how  
> brains work today that, at the very least, it is a huge overstatement  
> to refer to the first two types as "different fundamental kinds"?  In  
> other words, I will claim that type 2 is actually nothing more than a  
> subset of type 1, occurring in particular circumstances.  What  
> evidence goes against this view?
> -Pete

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