Le 01-nov.-05, à 21:05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
So why is it that from the 3rd person point of view everyone dies?
Because incompleteness in its 3-person "probabilistic" meaning is that:
IF you are alive THEN there is a non negligible probability that you
This means it would be miraculous seeing an *other* being immortal.
Life exists only near desequilibirum, at the border of the computable
and the non computable. Near death, near inconsistencies, ...
Also along the lines of the "Let There Be Something" thread, isn't it
also true that a finite set of finite histories, or even a countable
set of infinite histories, is of measure zero in the continuum?
Yes. But by UDA we already know the "normal histories" should have the
uncountable power of the continuum.
If this is the type of selection that is being made from The
Multiverse (whose measure >= measure(continuum)) to the "initial"
multiverse(s) of your and others' theories, then by the same argument
that you use to show that the probability of dying is zero, doesn't
this imply that the probability of having such an "initial" multiverse
I don't think so beacuse in this list "we" assume all initial
multiverses in a sense. With comp you don't need to assume an ontology
more rich than a tiny part of arithmetical truth (epistemologically we
need the whole Cantor Paradise or Platonia ...).
Perhaps a main point that people find sometimes hard to get is that the
*physical laws* emerge from the appearances of interference between
*all* the multiverses. (A little like the collapse of the Wave emerges
from *all* the Universes).
I may be in over my head, but if my "Let There Be Something" inquiry
is correct, then we're all in over our head.
I don't believe that we can explain everything from nothing. Actually,
without assuming the natural numbers, we cannot get the natural
numbers. But you do get the 1-everything from the interference of the
possible natural numbers dreams (something capable of precise
definition in computer science).
The only remaining mystery is our ability to grasp the notion of
natural numbers (or notion like finite, stopping, etc.). But here there
is a sort of meta-explanation of why a lobian machine cannot define
properly what she means by natural numbers, and this is provided by
some theorems in mathematical logic. Apparently numbers are sort of
unavoidable mysteries for any honest introspective (lobian) machine.