Le 01-nov.-05, à 21:05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :


So why is it that from the 3rd person point of view everyone dies?

Because incompleteness in its 3-person "probabilistic" meaning is that:

IF you are alive THEN there is a non negligible probability that you will die.

This means it would be miraculous seeing an *other* being immortal.

Life exists only near desequilibirum, at the border of the computable and the non computable. Near death, near inconsistencies, ...

Also along the lines of the "Let There Be Something" thread, isn't it also true that a finite set of finite histories, or even a countable set of infinite histories, is of measure zero in the continuum?

Yes. But by UDA we already know the "normal histories" should have the uncountable power of the continuum.

If this is the type of selection that is being made from The Multiverse (whose measure >= measure(continuum)) to the "initial" multiverse(s) of your and others' theories, then by the same argument that you use to show that the probability of dying is zero, doesn't this imply that the probability of having such an "initial" multiverse is zero?

I don't think so beacuse in this list "we" assume all initial multiverses in a sense. With comp you don't need to assume an ontology more rich than a tiny part of arithmetical truth (epistemologically we need the whole Cantor Paradise or Platonia ...).

Perhaps a main point that people find sometimes hard to get is that the *physical laws* emerge from the appearances of interference between *all* the multiverses. (A little like the collapse of the Wave emerges from *all* the Universes).

I may be in over my head, but if my "Let There Be Something" inquiry is correct, then we're all in over our head.

I don't believe that we can explain everything from nothing. Actually, without assuming the natural numbers, we cannot get the natural numbers. But you do get the 1-everything from the interference of the possible natural numbers dreams (something capable of precise definition in computer science). The only remaining mystery is our ability to grasp the notion of natural numbers (or notion like finite, stopping, etc.). But here there is a sort of meta-explanation of why a lobian machine cannot define properly what she means by natural numbers, and this is provided by some theorems in mathematical logic. Apparently numbers are sort of unavoidable mysteries for any honest introspective (lobian) machine.



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