Le 12-déc.-05, à 19:37, George Levy a écrit :



 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this make to his experience? It seems to me that there is no test or experiment the person could do which would allow him to determine if he is living in a period of high measure or low measure. If an OM is the smallest discernible unit of conscious experience, it therefore seems reasonable to treat multiple instantiations of the same OM as one OM.

 Yes Stathis, I agree with you completely.




This is delicate and I think we should really make the disctinction between the 3-OMs and the 1-OMs. Difference of measure of 3-OM does not change the quality of the 1-OMs experiences, but could change the relative probability of having some next 1-OMs.

To justify this, I point you on the UDA, or to the lobian interview. (We are coming back on this).





 Bruno wrote:
And this already comes from the fact that the "indistinguishabilitty/distinguishabilitty" crux is itself relative. By loosing memory something distinguishable can become indistinguishable, augmenting the class of (normal) self-consistent extensions.

Bruno, I find this question extremely difficult. Is indistinguishability established at the physical level or at the psychological level?


Psychological. Remember that with comp we take for granted some amount of folk or Grandmother psychology (enough for saying purposefully "yes" to the doctor). But then by the UDA, comp entails the complete structure of the physical laws. Now the goal is to make the derivation of the physical laws, so that we can test comp by comparing the comp-physics with the traditional empirical physics. With such kind of approach it is just forbidden to invoke anything physical as granted; we can certainly not take a physical multiverse or a physically based indistinguishability for granted.







If we say it is established at the psychological level, then even mental errors ( ie.6+7=11) count in defining a whole world.



"6+7=11" is not a mental error. It is just a false proposition. I guess you mean something like "B(6+7=11)". This is a *mental error*, where the "mentality" has been supposed to be captured by some modal epistemic logic "B" (a modal box). And then "6+7=11" is akin to a sort of white rabbit or flying pig, those which, of course we need still to justify the extreme rarity.





This is the ultimate in relativism. I can find reasons to go either way. (Ultimately Undecided?)


And now this makes sense indeed and the "Ultimately Undecided" is close to the "Forever Undecided" which will be tackle by the self-reference logics G and G*.






Then I am open that from the 1 point of view, fusion increases measure, duplication decreases measure; although from the 3 pov it is the contrary.

 I do not agree with you on this point Bruno.
>From the one person point of view measures remains constant just like the speed of light, the mass of an electron, or the number of points in a line 1 meter long or 1 kilometer long. (the number of points in a continuum is always the same no matter what the length of the line is). The one person always observes a continuum in the number of opportunities available to him no matter what his past history is.



That's true, but only for a notion of "actual 1-OMs", not necessarily for the 3-prediction on some possible (future) 1-OMs.





>From the third person point of view, it makes sense to consider ratios in measures, just like it makes sense to take ratios of line segments of different lengths.


OK.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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