Quentin Anciaux writes:

Le Mercredi 4 Janvier 2006 02:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> But it isn't possible to "die young" if QTI is true! Every time you come to
> a point where you might die, something will happen to save you. When you
> get really old, perhaps some anti-ageing treatment, or mind uploading is
> introduced just in time. Of course, there is no guarantee that you will
> continue living in full physical and mental vigour: you might just slowly
> deteriorate over time so that you end up spending centuries in a
> near-vegetative state. The question then arises, how close to a vegetable
> do you have to be before you can be pronounced dead for the purposes of
> QTI?

The real problem I see is that at every moments there must be branches that
leads to near-vegetative state soon... but as we are still talking we haven't
experienced these...

Another problem is that there must be a lot more observer moment of me being
very very old and sane than the total of observer moments I've experienced
till I have memories, but still I experience being very very young compared
to the age I should be in my "real life memories" (as it is much more longer
than what I've been living till now).

That means ordering is important in observer moments and ASSA must be false in
this respect.

That's right. First we experience being 10 years old, then 11, then 12, and so on. It never happens in any other order. And if it happens that there are twice as many copies of us in the multiverse between the ages of 11 and 12 as between the ages of 10 and 11, that doesn't mean we experience being 11 to 12 for twice as long as we experience being 10 to 11, or equivalently that we are twice as likely to find ourselves aged 11 to 12 as 10 to 11.

On the other hand, I no longer see what is the meaning of "I" in this context,
every next "i" (even those who fade out, go in hell) are continuity of my
present "I"... but none of them would recognize being the other "i" except
having be me... It leads to me that "I" is an instantaneous concept and I see
this very insatisfaying... feeling I think.

There are many good reasons to think of "I" as being an instantaneous concept, even if this seems at first glance to go against intuition. This is basically another formulation of the observer moment idea. It eliminates "paradoxes" of personal identity involving duplication thought experiments, and it allows us to talk about past, present, future and parallel versions of an individual precisely and unambiguously. It is an accident of evolution that we consider our future selves to be the "same" person as we are now and try to ensure their well-being. They might be made up of completely different matter to us, have only inaccurate memories of what we are experiencing now, and have only a vaquely similar sense of self. It would be no logical contradiction if we believed that our life effectively ended when we went to sleep each night, and accordingly used up all our resources today with no regard for the person who will wake up in our bed tomorrow. We don't think that way because people who did would have died out, but with a little effort it is possible to imagine sentient species with notions of continuity of individual identity very different from our own.

Stathis Papaioannou

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