Le 11-janv.-06, à 17:57, Benjamin Udell a écrit :


Bruno, list,

Well, on the basis of that which you say below (much of which I unfortunately only vaguely understand), where you don't focus it all decidedly on the particular issues of faith and belief, it actually does now sound more like some sort of theology. It has various elements of theology in the broader or more comprehensive sense.



Thanks for telling. Note that it is all normal you only vaguely understand my last post, because it is a very concise summary.





The thing that it seems to be missing is gods or God. Considered as theology, it seems like a wheel sorely missing its hub.


The neoplatonician use often the term "God" for "ultimate explanation", and also use often (but it is an idiosyncrasies) the names of the greek Gods for concept (EROS = love, THANATOS = death, etc.). Strictly speaking, it has nothing to do with the judeo-christian notion of God. Still, I like to define axiomatically God by something so big that it escapes any attempt to define it, except perhaps in some negative way. In that sense I could argue that the "God" of comp theology can be identified either with either the "ultimate explanation", the "root of everything" or even with the unnameable SELF which caracterizes the comp first person. Perhaps the chapter of "God" will be a necessary blank page in comp treatise. Now, I think that "GOD" as a term has much more heavy connotation than theology, but I am probably underestimating the stealing of "rational theology" by the political power (this happened sometimes after Plotinus death).




At this point, in terms of descriptive accuracy, this hublessness seems the hub of the matter. So it sounds like a kind of psycho-cosmology, or -- well, not a psychophysics, but, in order to suggest your computationalist primacy of the soul -- a physiopsychics (in English, if the adjective is "physicopsychical," it's a little less suggestive of paranormalism, which is strongly associated nowadays with the adjective "psychic.")

(C.S. Peirce held that matter is "congealed mind." Though he thought that space would turn out to be curved, he was pre-Einstein and saw matter as a kind of spentness and barrenness rather than as a tight lockup of energy.)

Your theory may be empirically refutable but, if it survives such tests, what is there to support its affirmation?


The UDA+MOVIEgraph argument. I will simply say UDA. (Universal Dovetailer Argument).




 Is derivability of physical laws from "laws of mind" really enough?


Would be nice, but the UDA shows there is no choice. Please understand that the UDA argument explains only but completely that if the comp hyp. is true then necessarily matter emerges from mind. Because this sounds so weird I have begin a derivation, at first just in order to illustrate what that could mean.



An information theorist, John Collier, said at the peirce email forum "peirce-l" that he had managed to derive each two among logic, information theory, and probability theory, from the third remaining, though I don't know whether he ever published these derivations.


Could be interesting.



Have you shown that your "laws of mind" cannot be derived from physics in a way that shows that the nonderivability is not merely a result of our insufficent knowledge of physical law? You may also encounter some flak on your conception of mind.


The problem is that physics does never really address the mind-body problem, with some exception like Mario Bunge, but he dismisses it and explain it "away" in a manner similar to Dennett. Many people have try and generally the honest one (like Dennett) admit their failure. It *is* a tricky problem. my original goal of my research (and thesis) was *just* to explain that the mind body problem was not yet solved. That is how and why I eventually translate it into a measure (on computational histories) problem, quite in line with discussion on this list.




For what it's worth, for my part, I would hold that a key factor in intelligence, at least, which learns and grows, is an evolvability factor, a kind of sufficient un-boundness to its "codes" and its methods and systems of interpretation, in order to be able to test those codes, methods, systems and to do so not only by trial and error but more sophisticated kinds of learning and testing, such that memory and active recollection take on particular importance.


I do agree with you here.




Do your laws of mind take evolvability into account? Maybe they don't need to, though, depending on what you mean by "mind." I tend to think that the mind must involve the retention and evolvability factor in some radical way, but it's quite vague to me how that would work. Maybe there are things which could fairly be called "mind" though I would never have thought of them that way.


As far as you don't (re)introduce substances, there is a possibility of staying coherent with comp. Now you question is tricky. Like in the block-universe of relativity there is no time "from outside". Time will be an internal modality, and can (and certainly will) play a basic role in the development of "intelligence". Well "space" got some important role too, but is trickier that time.




If I understood your theory I might also try to challenge the idea that the soul is both ontologically AND epistemologically primary.


Well I already distinguish the mind from the soul. The mind is a very general notion comprehending all imaterial notion from the number PI to the game of bridge and anything not reasonnablu described by pieces of Stuff (even nations and person belongs to "mind"). It is the "spiritual" or "immaterial" realm, and with comp it does not necessarily go outside the realm of mathematical (if not arithmetica) truth. The soul is really the first person or the knower, it is not as primary as arithmetical truth. It needs a lobian machine (which is a mathematical object). The knower is epistemological, but the mind is not. Comp reality is close to Rudy Rucker's Mindscape (if you know it(*)) except that it does not need many of its set theoretical construct at the bottom (they will appear as reflected in the object-discourse by machine).




Actually I wouldn't use, for my views, the term "primary" in a strong foundationalist sense, I just mean that, for various reasons, I regard the (sequential) order of knowledge to be the opposite of the (sequential) order of being.


If Stephen Paul King is still there, I think he would suggest you to read Pratt's approach of the mind body problem where a similar duality appears. Could be interesting, but it is hard to explain without abstract math (category theory).



Of course, in logic, some oppositions seems to reverse themselves across changes of level, so who knows, I'm not totally convinced about my own views either.


Me either ('bout my views). This is a lobian symptom of sanity :-)
(Note the Smiley, because I am saying probably a G* \ G truth here, which means I should probably shut up).

Bruno

PS I don't despair to make some comments on your "long post", although it could become less necessary given that I make partial answer through the posts which follow. In any case don't hesitate to repeat critics or question I would have missed.

(*) His book: "infinity and the mind" has been re-edited more or less recently.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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