Norman, Bruno and List: In #2 I vote for Bruno: 'Nescio no est argumentum', the fact that we "don't know about..." is not applicable as an argument. * In the question of a 'simulation', however, I find a more intrinsic point: (IN MY VOCABULARY) information means "difference acknowledged". So whatever we (can?) get to knowing is some difference. What means that a 'perfect simulation' (=the thing itself?) does not show up as 'another thing' in our mind. (Matching Bruno's view maybe in other words - not far from Norman's either).

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(This is my argument (untold and not submitted as an argument) - against the infinite 'imitations' of 'our universe' in certain Multiverse visions. IMO the universes are different, infinitely in any qualia, otherwise it makes no sense (to me).) John M --- Norman Samish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Bruno, > > Thanks for your response. I don't understand why > you say my argument is not valid. Granted, much of > what you write is unintelligible to me because you > are expert in fields of which I know little. > Nevertheless, a cat can look at a king. Here is > what we've said so far: > > (Norman ONE) My conjecture is that a perfect > simulation by a limited-resource AI would not be > possible. If this is correct, then self-aware > simulations that are perpetually unaware that they > are simulations would not be possible. > > (Bruno ONE) This could be a reasonable conjecture. I > have explain on the list that if we are a simulation > then indeed after a finite time we could have > strong evidence that this is the case, for example > by discoveries of discrepancies between the > "comp-physics" and the "observed physics". > > (Norman TWO) Humans have not made the discovery > that they are simulations, therefore the most > PROBABLE (emphasis added) situation is that we are > not simulations. > > (Bruno TWO) This argument is not valid. The reason > is that if we could be "correct" simulation (if that > exists), then that would remain essentially > undecidable. (Then I could argue the premise is > false. Violation of bell's inequalities could be > taken as an argument that we are in a simulation > (indeed in the infinity of simulation already > "present" in the "mathematical running" of a > universal dovetailer, or arithmetical truth.) > > (Norman THREE) I don't understand the part of > "Bruno TWO" in parentheses - I'm not asking you to > explain it to me. Are you saying that a perfect > simulation would not necessarily discover it was a > simulation? If so, I agree. This is supported in > "Bruno ONE" where you said it was reasonable that if > we are a simulation we would, in finite time, > discover that this is the case. Therefore it seems > to me that my statement in "Norman TWO" is correct - > note my inclusion of the word "probable." Do you > agree? Or am I missing your point? > > Norman