Hi Russel,

   Interleaving some comments...

----- Original Message ----- From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Everything-List List" <everything-list@eskimo.com>
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2006 6:18 PM
Subject: Re: Artificial Philosophizing
On Thu, Feb 09, 2006 at 03:05:48PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>A UD can generate the set of all random strings, but it still needs to
>select a single string to be equivalent to a Geiger counter.
>this is impossible for a Turing machine ...

Not if the UD (which is a turing machine) copies you each time it
generates one bit of the random strings.

I had a smart response here, and I just realised I had misinterpreted
the word "copy" here, so I just deleted it. "Copy" in English also
means to send something (envoyer) ("I copied him in on the
conversation"), as well as to reproduce something.


Does it not seem incoherent to use terms that imply some form of *process* when considering notions that are implicitly changeless and static? This has perpetually bothered me in the discussions of the neoplatonians... BTW, copying is the identity morphism for computations (and informorphisms in general) in Pratt's discussion of Chu spaces...

Yes you are quite right (under COMP, and under the more regular meaning
of "copy"). However, I don't think this is how a Geiger counter works...


It does seem that Bruno is considering the ticks, etc. of the Geiger Counter as included in the over all 1st person aspect of the bit string, this would include all aspects of the experience of the "Geiger Counter"...

This is the idea of getting the quantum indeterminacy as a particular
case of the comp first person indeterminacy. I think it is the idea of
Everett and everything-like theories.

>but rather trivial from a
>real, physical machine.

Accepting not only weak-materialism (existence of primitive matter) and
the quantum theory that is accepting the existence of primitive matter
and that it obeys to the quantum. But this is the kind of things we are
trying to explain (from simpler things, like numbers and/or comp etc.).

This is one point where I depart from your metaphysics. Traditional
aristotelianism asserts existence of matter, and that psyche emerges
from that. You assert the existence of numbers, and of psyche, and
show how matter arises from that.

I think both are needed. The psyche supervenes on matter, and the
properties of matter depend on the psyche. All of which exists because
numbers exist. There is a name for such a concept - "strange loop". I
thought this name was due to Stewart and Cohen, but it appears
Hofstadter got there first in GEB.


Are you considering a Categorical difference of classes here, in the sense that the classof matter structures/processes is different (in kind not degree) from the class of psychies? Have you considered Vaughan Pratt's idea for a relationship between them?

The reason I have come to this position is that try as I might, I
cannot remove the Anthropic Principle as an axiom. I would dearly love
someone to show that it is a consequence of other assumptions, or can
be derived from such by means of a simple, obvious assumption. But
most people I talk to don't even see the problem (perhaps because
they're still grounded in Aristotelian ways...)


I concurr with this observation; it is as if most people do not see the deep conundrum that exist within the Aristotelian hylemorphism (http://radicalacademy.com/jdcosmology2.htm) in its assumption of a primal "substance" which, if I understand correctly, is seperated into its plethora of forms by many processes. It is the origin of the latter that I argue should be considered as fundamental, as a primitive class Becoming (ala Bergson), and substance is then shown to be the class of all forms that can emerge (think morphisms) from Becoming. Pratt's idea seems to add a dual to this morphism that would include such notions as computations; we then have a nice duality that avoid's Descartes' fallasy of trying to build dualism from substantivalism, ala res extensa and res cognitas.

>I can do it on my computer, for example,
>showing it to be capable of more than a Turing machine.

Only if your computer is interfaced with a quantum generator (assuming
the quantum theory).

But it is. Its called a keyboard. (The faster you type, the more
genuine randomness is generated). Do a Google search on /dev/random,
or on "Havege"*. There is also a fantastically complicated quantum
random generator that consists of an arrangement of spinning disks
interacting with a volume of air@ (OK perhaps not proven quantum, but
our best theories that describe the operation of the device, ie Chaos
theory, indicates quantum influence).


Would the subclass of all of these randomness generators include automorphisms?

 author =   {Andr\'e Seznec and Nicolas Sendrier},
title = {{HAVEGE}: A user-level software heuristic for generating empirically strong random numbers},
 journal =   {{ACM} Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation},
 year =   2003,
 volume =  13,
 pages =  {334--346}

 author =   {Jakobsson, M. and Shriver, E. and Hillyer, E. and Juels, A.},
 title =   {A Practical Secure Physical Random Bit Generator},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th {ACM} Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
 pages =  {103--111},
 year =  1998,
 address =  {San Francisco},
 month =  {November}


   Any of these available online free, to non-academics like me?



Reply via email to