Le 16-févr.-06, à 19:02, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :

Responses interspersed below.

Le 15-févr.-06, à 17:30, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : 
As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a machine is. 
Actually I was just saying that no machine can *fully* grasp *all
aspect* of machine. But machines can know what machines are. Only, if a machine M1 is more complex than M2, M2 will not been able to prove the consistency of M1, for example. And then if we are machine (comp) such limitations apply to us, and this provides lot of informations, including negative one which we can not prove except that we can derive them from the initial comp act of faith ("yes doctor"). 

Actually I was referring to what you said in the "belief..." thread

where you respond to my statement
This runs counter to the whole PHILOSOPHY (mind you)
of modern science, that we are simply machines, and that
there is no WHY.

This is due to the materialist who like to use the idea
that we are simply machine just to put under the rug
all the interesting open problem of (platonician) theology.
Since Godel's discovery this position is untenable.

Now we
know that we don't know really what machines are.

OK. Really my fault. I write too quickly. I should have written "Now we don't know really what machines are CAPABLE OF". Somehow we can have complete knowledge of the machine thrid person description and also of its local functioning, but even for simple machine we cannot in general predict their long term behaviors.

the comp-or-weaker hyp, we already know that if we are
machine then the physical laws emerges from in a totally
precise and testable way.

So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps we end up running
away from ill-defined words like "machine", "reason", "soul", "faith", etc., for who knows what personal "reasons". 
That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning = provability =
Bp = Beweisbar("p") cf Godel 1931. Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp & p = third Plotinus' hypostase. This can look as an oversimplification but the gap between truth and provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G) detrivialises (if I can say) all this. 

My fault. I will come back on this. 


Actually, when I was talking about a lack of precise definition, I wasn't referring to you, Bruno. I was talking about what happens in the general conversation when we don't define our terms, or when we are assuming different definitions based on different philosophies consciously or unconsciously held.

On the contrary, I would echo John Mikes' sentiment that some of your definitions seem too simple for my taste. I think I would agree with your definition of reasoning though, but I take issue with your definition of Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp & p. I think elsewhere you also define Knowledge as Belief & Truth, and I have the same problem with that. These definitions seem too simple. These seem equivalent to accidental true belief and accidental true proof. They lack the justification factor. (I feel a reference to G*/G coming. ;) ) Anyway, perhaps we can start a new thread if we want to talk about this part some more, or this is probably what you've been trying to explain to us all along in previous threads.

Bp & p seems too simple. Actually, given that I limit myself in the interview of sound machines, we know that they obey to Bp -> p, by definition (a sound machine proves only true statements: so Bp -> p). So we know Bp and Bp & p are equivalent, so you could at first believe that the soul = the intellect. Exercise: what is wrong?
Answer tomorrow :-)   (+ answers to Danny and Ben).



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