Hi John,

If I remember correctly Robert Rosen does not accept Church Thesis. This explains some fundamental difference of what we mean respectively by "machine". I use the term for digitalizable machine, which, with Church thesis, is equivalent with "programs", or with anything a computer can imitate. With Church thesis all computer (universal machine) are equivalent and can emulate (simulate perfectly) each other.

The machine I talk about are mathematical object in Platonia. I never use machine in the materialist sense of something having some body to act in a environment, because my goal is to find out why immaterial machine in Platonia are confronted with stable appearance of materiality.

I hope this can help a little bit,



Le 17-févr.-06, à 21:27, John M a écrit :


Now a silly point: after so much back and forth about
'machines' and our best efforts to grasp what we
should understand, would it be asking too much to
re-include a BRIEF identification about the way YOU
use the term? (Never mind Loeb).

It would help me for sure. I could not decipher it
from the quoted URLs (yours included),

Lately on the Rosen-list Robert Rosen's 'machine' term
got so mixed up that my understanding what I developed
some 5-6 years ago got mixed up. It is different from
yours, which just adds to the confusion. Yours is also
going on over at least 2-3 years.


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