Hi, I comment Georges Quenot's Post, and then I try to meet Peter D Jones critics on Quentin Anciaux.

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Le 14-mars-06, à 10:31, Georges Quenot wrote: > > Norman Samish wrote: >> >> I don't see how a list of numbers could, by itself, contain any >> meaningful >> information. Sure, a list of numbers could be an executable program, >> but >> there has to be an executive program to execute the executable >> program. >> >> The multiverse has to therefore consist of more than a matrix of >> numbers >> which amount to an executable program. > > I feel that the computational approach is a wrong direction > for the question of existence. The question is whether comp is true or not. If comp is false then it should obviously lead to a wrong direction for the question of existence. If comp is true, then we have no choice to derive the many form of possible existence or appearances from it. > A matrix of numbers is not > the only type of mathematical object the multiverse can be. I am not sure what you mean by matrix of numbers. Now I agree with your point in the sense that if follows from the UDA that if comp is true then many things, including the appearance of a multiverse go well beyond most mathematical object. This is corroborate by the fact that the first person description is already not definable by a mathematical object, from the first person point of view. You can get an intuitive understanding of this key feature by following the UDA, or to get a mathematical or computer science theoretical understanding through the study of incompleteness. > >> Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could >> call >> it "God." I can think of no possibility other than "It was always >> there," >> and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any >> other >> possibilities? > > I think there is another possibility. I tried to explain it > in my exchanges with John. It relies on several speculations > or conjectures: > > - Mathematical objects exist by themeslves ("They were > (or: are, intemporal) always there"), OK (I could add some nuances but at this stage it would be confusing: roughly speaking we must keep in mind that "all the mathematical object" cannot be a mathematical object). Note: it is like in Plotinus. The big "ONE" cannot be among the "existing" things even if all existing things proceed from it. > - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, What do you mean? I guess this: The multiverse is not a mathematical object, but still is describable by a mathematical object. I don't think so. If comp is true the mutiverse should not be entirely describable (in any third person term) by any mathematical object. If we are numbers our possibilities go beyond what we can describe in term of mathematical object (and that is why I insist that comp is antireductionist). > - Perception of existence is an internal property of the > multiverse (mind emerges from matter activity), The multiverse would be "physical"? But then: What is mind, what is matter, what is activity? Are you postulating a physical universe? In that case comp-or-weaker is just false. Let me recall that the UDA shows that if we can survive (in the folk sense) through a digital body substitution, then physical appearances must be justified entirely without any physical ontological commitment. Arithmetical truth already contains the full description of the deployment of a full quantum universal doevetailer, but it remains to explain why such a quantum realm wins the "white rabbit hunting battle" (that is how it solve the measure problem). > - Mathematical existence and physical existence are the > same ("there is no need that something special be inside > particles", the contrary is an unnecessary and useless > dualism, "the fire *is* in the equations"). All this is too much ambiguous for me. I tend to criticize all *fundamental* dualism. I agree with you that the fire is in the equation (or more aptly in their solutions, or still more aptly: in the memory of the possible observer-machine described relatively by (all) their solutions). =================== Now please let me quote the short dialog between Peter and Quentin, which are addressing a key and probably difficult point: >> Quentin Anciaux: But whatever you do with numbers can be encoding >> with numbers, as such >> assuming platonic existence, numbers are the only requirements, >> because >> operation on them, discourse about them, description on them are >> numbers too. > > Peter D Jones: Hmm. You can hardly claim that the meaning is intrinsic > to the number. > Does "2" mean "red", "mammal", "male" or what ? It could be mean > anything in a given coding scheme. > Quentin Anciaux: I agree, but the coding scheme is also a number. > Peter D Jones: Is that a fact, or something you need to assume to > maintain the > argument ? > Quentin Anciaux: The coding scheme is the instruction set of a turing > machine, which is also a > number... I'm stuck ;) > > Peter D Jones: Can TM's interpret -- or do they need to be interpreted > ? When a (may be universal) Turing machine M1 interprets some piece of code C, such an interpretation is only defined relatively to some ... other Universal Turing machine M2. Now, if that piece of code, when interpreted, corresponds to the running of some "conscious program" C, that conscious entity, from its first person perspective, is not just related to M2 or to M1 but to *all* Universal Machine embedded through *all* possible codings in the arithmetical Platonia (that the main UDA point). Now, by Godel's coding technic, all those executions can be entirely and completely defined by pure relation among (natural) numbers, and no conscious entity can attach itself directly to that level, but, by UDA, can attach itself only to the infinity of similar processes corresponding to the sufficiently similar relation between numbers. So Peter Jones is right when he says that "2" could code anything a priori, but "2" will only *code* something relatively to some precise Universal machine ... itself coded by some universal machine, etc. until we get the grounded level of arithmetical truth where "2" and any number will code themselves, and addition or multiplication will mean the standard addition or multiplication of Platonia. You can get a better picture by thinking more precisely on the universal dovetailing, and coding it entirely in term of relations between conventional numbers. It is probably a subtle point and it is hard to explain without more explanation of Godel's technic of arithmetization and its relation with computer science through Church thesis. Perhaps it is easier to see this the other way round. Arithmetical truth has nothing conventional. The fact that 17 is prime is an absolute truth, where of course 17 represents the number of strokes in "IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII" (and not the string "17" which indeed could means red, mammal, male, or what.) Once you agree with this, it is just a matter of work (which should be obvious for computer scientists) that unconventional truth about sophisticated relations between numbers will represent sophisticated computational histories, including universalone, including universal one, etc. With comp each of our first person conscious experience will be associated to the usual infinity of sufficiently fine grained (cf the comp subsititution level) third person computational histories. The "real" problem is to show that the aberrant stories and other white rabbits vanish from some first person "normal" point of view (and then this is handled in the thesis by the lobian interview). This explanation relies heavily on some understanding of the UDA argument. See http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm A key point is that our first person expectations depend on an infinity of computational histories, and this results from the fact that the first persons cannot be aware of the (incredibly long) delays appearing in the running of those never terminating programs. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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