Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 14-mars-06, à 10:31, Georges Quenot wrote:
>> [...]
>> I feel that the computational approach is a wrong direction
>> for the question of existence.
> The question is whether comp is true or not. If comp is false then it 
> should obviously lead to a wrong direction for the question of 
> existence. If comp is true, then we have no choice to derive the many 
> form of possible existence or appearances from it.

Comp might be false.

>> A matrix of numbers is not
>> the only type of mathematical object the multiverse can be.
> I am not sure what you mean by matrix of numbers.

I am not sure either :-) I referred to what Norman meant by it.
For what I could imagine, it did not include all mathematical
objects and possibly not the ones that might be isomorphic to
our universe or multiverse.

> Now I agree with your point in the sense that if follows from the UDA 
> that if comp is true then many things, including the appearance of a 
> multiverse go well beyond most mathematical object.

It might well go beyond many mathematical objects (I am not
sure we can say "most" unless yoy meant "most currently known")
and still be (isomorphic to) a mathematical object.

>> [...]
>> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
> What do you mean? I guess this: The multiverse is not a mathematical 
> object, but still  is describable by a mathematical object.

No. I mean that there is a one to one correspondance between
the "components" of the multiverse and those of a particular
mathematical object and that this correspondance also maps the
"internal structures" of the multiverse with those of this
mathematical object. "Components" and "internal structures"
should not be understood here as atoms or people or the like
but only "at the most primitive level".

> I don't think so. If comp is true the mutiverse should not be entirely 
> describable (in any third person term) by any mathematical object. If 
> we are numbers our possibilities go beyond what we can describe in term 
> of mathematical object (and that is why I insist that comp is 
> antireductionist).

*If* comp is true. I am not sure of that.

>> - Perception of existence is an internal property of the
>>    multiverse (mind emerges from matter activity),
> The multiverse would be "physical"?

Yes but what "physical" actually might mean is unclear.

> But then: What is mind, what is matter, what is activity?

I would say for all three: emerging properties that appear
as such when "viewed from the inside" of the universe.

> Are you postulating a physical universe?

This is an ill-formed question. The universe could be purely
mathematical and still appear as physical from the inside.

> In that case comp-or-weaker is just false.


> Let me recall that the UDA shows that if we can survive 
> (in the folk sense) through a digital body substitution, then physical 
> appearances must be justified entirely without any physical ontological 
> commitment.

The question of whether we would survive a digital body
substitution does not seem solved to me. I am not sure we
would ou could.

> Arithmetical truth already contains the full description of 
> the deployment of a full quantum universal doevetailer, but it remains 
> to explain why such a quantum realm wins the "white rabbit hunting 
> battle" (that is how it solve the measure problem).

Yes. Many things remain to be explained and we may still be
far to discover which mathematical object we live in (if we
do, indeed).

>> - Mathematical existence and physical existence are the
>>    same ("there is no need that something special be inside
>>    particles", the contrary is an unnecessary and useless
>>    dualism, "the fire *is* in the equations").
> All this is too much ambiguous for me.

This is the hard part.

> I tend to criticize all *fundamental* dualism.

Okham's razor doesn't like them too, especially when they
appear unable to help to explain anything more.

> I agree with you that the fire is in the 
> equation (or more aptly in their solutions,

The difference between equations and their solutions might
only be a question of viewpoint.

> or still more aptly: in the 
> memory of the possible observer-machine described relatively by (all) 
> their solutions).

I do not understand. Unless you refer to the previous
speculation/conjecture. Indeed, the perception of "actual"
fire in the equation is itself included in the (development
of) the same equations. This is exactly what I suggested.
This indeed questions the meaning we should give to
"physical" existence.


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