Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :

> No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects
> exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only
> isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed
> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract.

I thought I was understanding your last comments on my post, i.e:
and I was preparing some comment, which can't make sense with
your present remark to Peter D Jones.

What do you mean by "real existence"?
What do you mean by a non abstract mathematical object?

It would help to know if you have studied the Universal Dovetailer 
Argument, which shows that by making the comp hyp, the "physical 
universe" cannot be isomorphic to a mathematical object, because "the 
physical universe" can only emerge on an infinity of "overlapping 
computations" as seen from some first person (plural) point of views, 
and then (this is non trivial) it can be shown that this is not 
captured by any mathematical objects. The reason is that the whole 
collection of mathematical objects cannot be itself a mathematical 
object, but physical appearances emerges from inside from a "measure" 
on that undefinable whole.
With some set theories like Quine NF (New Foundations) it looks like 
the whole mathematical universe could be a mathematical objects. But 
then this shows that NF will got problem with comp.
The notion mathematical wholeness is very tricky (to say the least). 
Actually, without comp, I have no clues how to give sense to such 
I persist finding rather unclear the use you are making of the term 
"universe", even in your monist and immaterialist (if I got you right) 


PS take your time to answer. I will be busy. Also next week I will 
present the Universal Dovetailer Argument in London; cf:


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