John M wrote: > Quentin, about those darn numbers: > > Although I am not FOR their omnipotence/science and > have some reservations - as I explained partially - > I have a different notion HOW "a number" can "mean" > whatever. > * > Older members who still went to libraries (before the > computer only generation <G>) may remember the still > existing "decimal" system to organize library-stuff > (and anything else). It had basic topics in a decimal > form, where the fractional part identified the detail, > then with additions in (-), /, :, [-], and > +,-,_,=,etc. you name it, ALL connotations, details, > relations and peculiarities could be specified and > included into THAT "NUMBER" (sometimes pretty long). > This was a primitive way and I am sure the > number-lover members of this list know better, but for > starters this could be a hint how numbers can 'mean' > something.
The meaning still isn't *in* the number. You have to understand how the dewey system works. > --- Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > > > > Hmm. You can hardly claim that the meaning is > > intrinsic to the number. > > > Does "2" mean "red", "mammal", "male" or what ? It > > could be mean > > > anything in a given coding scheme. > > > > I agree, but the coding scheme is also a number. is it ? we might be able to ground meaning in causal interactions, for instance, but can we ground causal interactions in the timeless world of maths ? Georges Quenot wrote: > Norman Samish wrote: > > > > Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call > > it "God." I can think of no possibility other than "It was always there," > > and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any other > > possibilities? > > I think there is another possibility. I tried to explain it > in my exchanges with John. It relies on several speculations > or conjectures: > > - Mathematical objects exist by themeslves ("They were > (or: are, intemporal) always there"), > - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, > - Perception of existence is an internal property of the > multiverse (mind emerges from matter activity), Given your commitment below, you also need to suppose that perception is an internal property of maths. > - Mathematical existence and physical existence are the > same ("there is no need that something special be inside > particles", the contrary is an unnecessary and useless > dualism, "the fire *is* in the equations"). That can only be the case if the multiverse is isomporphic to *every* mathematical object and not just one. If it is only isomorphic to some mathematical objects, that *is* the difference between physical and mathematical existence. > Some details and some (weak) arguments can be found in my > recent posts to this group. Some papers from Max Tegmark > are also relevant: > > http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe_frames.html > http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.pdf > http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/multiverse.pdf > > Georges. Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi, > > I comment Georges Quenot's Post, and then I try to meet Peter D Jones > critics on Quentin Anciaux. > > > Le 14-mars-06, à 10:31, Georges Quenot wrote: > > > > > Norman Samish wrote: > >> > >> I don't see how a list of numbers could, by itself, contain any > >> meaningful > >> information. Sure, a list of numbers could be an executable program, > >> but > >> there has to be an executive program to execute the executable > >> program. > >> > >> The multiverse has to therefore consist of more than a matrix of > >> numbers > >> which amount to an executable program. > > > > I feel that the computational approach is a wrong direction > > for the question of existence. > > > The question is whether comp is true or not. The question is whether COMP means a) a human mind can be implemented by running as a process on a physical computer. b) a human mind can be implemented a programme sitting on a hard disk c) a human mind can be implemented by a series of 1's and 0' floating around in Plato's heaven. > > - Mathematical objects exist by themeslves ("They were > > (or: are, intemporal) always there"), > > > OK (I could add some nuances but at this stage it would be confusing: > roughly speaking we must keep in mind that "all the mathematical > object" cannot be a mathematical object). > Note: it is like in Plotinus. The big "ONE" cannot be among the > "existing" things even if all existing things proceed from it. Is there a specifically mathematical reason for that? > > - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, > > > What do you mean? I guess this: The multiverse is not a mathematical > object, but still is describable by a mathematical object. > I don't think so. If comp is true the mutiverse should not be entirely > describable (in any third person term) by any mathematical object. And if we, who are doing the describing, are not , mathematical objects, why should we not assert that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical object ? You are assuming the conclusion. > If > we are numbers our possibilities go beyond what we can describe in term > of mathematical object (and that is why I insist that comp is > antireductionist). > > > > - Perception of existence is an internal property of the > > multiverse (mind emerges from matter activity), > > The multiverse would be "physical"? But then: What is mind, what is > matter, what is activity? > Are you postulating a physical universe? In that case comp-or-weaker > is just false. Let me recall that the UDA shows that if we can survive > (in the folk sense) through a digital body substitution, then physical > appearances must be justified entirely without any physical ontological > commitment. Arithmetical truth already contains the full description of > the deployment of a full quantum universal doevetailer, but it remains > to explain why such a quantum realm wins the "white rabbit hunting > battle" (that is how it solve the measure problem). > > - Mathematical existence and physical existence are the > > same ("there is no need that something special be inside > > particles", the contrary is an unnecessary and useless > > dualism, "the fire *is* in the equations"). > > > All this is too much ambiguous for me. I tend to criticize all > *fundamental* dualism. I agree with you that the fire is in the > equation (or more aptly in their solutions, or still more aptly: in the > memory of the possible observer-machine described relatively by (all) > their solutions). > > Peter D Jones: Is that a fact, or something you need to assume to > > maintain the > > argument ? > > > Quentin Anciaux: The coding scheme is the instruction set of a turing > > machine, which is also a > > number... I'm stuck ;) > > > > > Peter D Jones: Can TM's interpret -- or do they need to be interpreted > > ? > > > When a (may be universal) Turing machine M1 interprets some piece of > code C, such an interpretation is only defined relatively to some ... > other Universal Turing machine M2. Is it ? Surely is is interpeted by us. > Now, if that piece of code, when > interpreted, corresponds to the running of some "conscious program" C, > that conscious entity, from its first person perspective, is not just > related to M2 or to M1 but to *all* Universal Machine embedded through > *all* possible codings in the arithmetical Platonia (that the main UDA > point). Now, by Godel's coding technic, all those executions can be > entirely and completely defined by pure relation among (natural) > numbers, and no conscious entity can attach itself directly to that > level, but, by UDA, can attach itself only to the infinity of similar > processes corresponding to the sufficiently similar relation between > numbers. > So Peter Jones is right when he says that "2" could code anything a > priori, but "2" will only *code* something relatively to some precise > Universal machine ... itself coded by some universal machine, etc. > until we get the grounded level of arithmetical truth where "2" and any > number will code themselves, and addition or multiplication will mean > the standard addition or multiplication of Platonia. errr...yes. But you still have the problem of getting contingent and changing worldly truths out of the timeless truths of mathematics. > You can get a better picture by thinking more precisely on the > universal dovetailing, and coding it entirely in term of relations > between conventional numbers. > It is probably a subtle point and it is hard to explain without more > explanation of Godel's technic of arithmetization and its relation with > computer science through Church thesis. > > Perhaps it is easier to see this the other way round. Arithmetical > truth has nothing conventional. The fact that 17 is prime is an > absolute truth, where of course 17 represents the number of strokes in > "IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII" (and not the string "17" which indeed could means > red, mammal, male, or what.) I see that mathematical truth does not require external interpretation; I don't see how you get from universal, eternal and necessary truths to local and contingent ones about particular things existing in particular places. > Once you agree with this, it is just a matter of work (which should be > obvious for computer scientists) that unconventional truth about > sophisticated relations between numbers will represent sophisticated > computational histories, including universalone, including universal > one, etc. With comp each of our first person conscious experience will > be associated to the usual infinity of sufficiently fine grained (cf > the comp subsititution level) third person computational histories. > The "real" problem is to show that the aberrant stories and other white > rabbits vanish from some first person "normal" point of view (and then > this is handled in the thesis by the lobian interview). > > This explanation relies heavily on some understanding of the UDA > argument. See > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm > A key point is that our first person expectations depend on an infinity > of computational histories, and this results from the fact that the > first persons cannot be aware of the (incredibly long) delays appearing > in the running of those never terminating programs. > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Georges Quenot wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> [...] > >> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, > > > > What do you mean? I guess this: The multiverse is not a mathematical > > object, but still is describable by a mathematical object. > > No. I mean that there is a one to one correspondance between > the "components" of the multiverse and those of a particular > mathematical object and that this correspondance also maps the > "internal structures" of the multiverse with those of this > mathematical object. "Components" and "internal structures" > should not be understood here as atoms or people or the like > but only "at the most primitive level". That is the standard meaning of isomorphic. And if A isomorphic to B, that does not mean that A is the same thing as B or even the same kind of thing. > > Are you postulating a physical universe? > > This is an ill-formed question. The universe could be purely > mathematical and still appear as physical from the inside. Things are what they are, not what they appear to be. > > Arithmetical truth already contains the full description of > > the deployment of a full quantum universal doevetailer, but it remains > > to explain why such a quantum realm wins the "white rabbit hunting > > battle" (that is how it solve the measure problem). > > Yes. Many things remain to be explained and we may still be > far to discover which mathematical object we live in (if we > do, indeed). If we live inside any particular mathematical object as opposed to others, (if one mathematical object is instantiated in reality) then we don't live in a purely mathematical world, since pure maths cannot explain why only one of its objects should be instantiated. > > I tend to criticize all *fundamental* dualism. > > Okham's razor doesn't like them too, especially when they > appear unable to help to explain anything more. If mathematical "objects" do no exist at all there is no dualism. > > I agree with you that the fire is in the > > equation (or more aptly in their solutions, Why some equations rather than others ? --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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