> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>> Georges Quenot wrote:
>>>> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
>>>> other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what
>>>> I called a dualist view.
>>> Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances.
>>> Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical
>>> realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism.
>> This *splits* "things" into "realness" and "abstractedness".
> No abstract "objects" aren't real things at all.

Well... I am not sure I should insist. I do not want to
force you to believe or consider something you are not
willing to believe or consider.

The question is not whether they are real things or not.
It is whether they are things or not. Once they are things,
you have to decide how many types of things there must be.

You might well feel otherwise but, for me, *they are not

Just tell me: do you consider "natural numbers" as something,
as nothing, as "something" that would neither be something
nor nothing, or as "anything else" (please explain)? Please
answer without considering whether they are "real" or not,
just whether thet are something, nothing, ... *Then* we can
discuss *which type of* "thing" (or whatever) they might be.

> There is only
> one kind of existing thing, ie real, physical things.

You should clarify: do you mean existing, real or physical?
Which is which and on which ground which is a specific of
(or identical to) which? How do you define any of them?

>> It postulates "material substance"
> yes, but only material substance. Hence it is monism, not dualism.

No, this is "material substance" besides "abstract objetcs".
You do split things between "material" and "immaterial".

>> just as classical dualism
>> postulates a "spiritual substance"
> as well as a material substance.

Yes and you do oppose material (real) things to immaterial
(abstract) ones.

>> (and just as once vitalism
>> postulated a "living substance").
>> Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean
>> bt "real" except by a tautology or via a reference to common
>> sense that no longer appears to be consensual.
> I am not sure what you mean by "non-consensual". Everyone believes
> that sticks and stones and what they had for breakfast are real.

Not everyone believe that and that is not a joke. But the
main point is that not everybody gives the same meaning to
"real". I guarantee you that there are people (including
me) that do not feel things as you do in this matters (not
to say that something must be wrong either way, only that
several distinct and incompatible views actually coexist).

>>>> Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that
>>>> when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse
>>>> IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends
>>>> the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while
>>>> when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed
>>>> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract."
>>> Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you
>>> ever seen the number 3?
>> Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron?
> They can be detected by apropriate instrumentation.

This might be more complicated. Looking at "them"
can significantly change them. They might also be an
abstraction. They can hardly be "objects" in the common
sense of the word.

>> Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother?
>> :-)
>> You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does
>> not (completely) appear as such to everybody.
> The Devil is in the details. I await mathematical-monist accounts of
> consciousness, causality and time.

Don't be so impatient. Mankind has been awaiting for
thousands of years an account of how living beings can
have appeared in an inert world and though the account
is now about a century and a half old it still did not
make it to a significant portion of mankind (if not
the majority).

I am also awaiting for a physical-monist account of how
consciousness can arise in living beings. This might
take a few centuries to come. What is astounding is that
it could emerge just through matter activity. Going from
matter to consciousness is the hardest part for me. Once
given, going from mathematics to physics is a fascinating
idea but it does not make more or less mysterious the
emergence of consciousness.

Causality and time in a physical-monist view do not appear
so mysterious to me. It does not appear more mysterious
in a mathematical-monist view. I once suggested that
what could make our universe special and "exist more"
than others is that it can be *chosen* among a set of
universe following the same set of rules by adding one
specific rule that would specify that the block universe
(ie seen as a spatiotemporal object) is the one which
is as "more ordered on one (temporal) side than on the
other" as possible. This is all we need to explain
causality and time (and this is my fifth speculation).


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