Georges Quénot wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Georges Quénot wrote:
> >
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >>> Georges Quenot wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
> >>>> other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what
> >>>> I called a dualist view.
> >>> Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances.
> >>> Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical
> >>> realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism.
> >> This *splits* "things" into "realness" and "abstractedness".
> >
> > No abstract "objects" aren't real things at all.
>
> Well... I am not sure I should insist. I do not want to
> force you to believe or consider something you are not
> willing to believe or consider.
>
> The question is not whether they are real things or not.
> It is whether they are things or not.

They are not. The King of France is not a person.

> Once they are things,
> you have to decide how many types of things there must be.
>
> You might well feel otherwise but, for me, *they are not
> nothing*.
>
> Just tell me: do you consider "natural numbers" as something,
> as nothing, as "something" that would neither be something
> nor nothing, or as "anything else" (please explain)?

I consider them as concepts , as the intentional
objects of neural activity. Of course intentional
objects are not real things -- things are not brought into existence
by thinking about them.

> Please
> answer without considering whether they are "real" or not,
> just whether thet are something, nothing, ... *Then* we can
> discuss *which type of* "thing" (or whatever) they might be.
>
> > There is only
> > one kind of existing thing, ie real, physical things.
>
> You should clarify: do you mean existing, real or physical?
> Which is which and on which ground which is a specific of
> (or identical to) which? How do you define any of them?

It think they all mean the same as each other, i.e. causally connected
to me.

> >> It postulates "material substance"
> >
> > yes, but only material substance. Hence it is monism, not dualism.
>
> No, this is "material substance" besides "abstract objetcs".

Not if abstract "objects" do not really exist at all.

> You do split things between "material" and "immaterial".

I do not split existing things.

> >> just as classical dualism
> >> postulates a "spiritual substance"
> >
> > as well as a material substance.
>
> Yes and you do oppose material (real) things to immaterial
> (abstract) ones.

I oppose existence to non-existence. However, existence
is not sub-divided into two realms.

> >> (and just as once vitalism
> >> postulated a "living substance").
> >>
> >> Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean
> >> bt "real" except by a tautology or via a reference to common
> >> sense that no longer appears to be consensual.
> >
> > I am not sure what you mean by "non-consensual". Everyone believes
> > that sticks and stones and what they had for breakfast are real.
>
> Not everyone believe that and that is not a joke. But the
> main point is that not everybody gives the same meaning to
> "real". I guarantee you that there are people (including
> me) that do not feel things as you do in this matters (not
> to say that something must be wrong either way, only that
> several distinct and incompatible views actually coexist).

Even people who think numbers are real do not think
they are real in the same sense as their breakfast.

> >>>> Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that
> >>>> when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse
> >>>> IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends
> >>>> the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while
> >>>> when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed
> >>>> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract."
> >>> Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you
> >>> ever seen the number 3?
> >> Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron?
> >
> > They can be detected by apropriate instrumentation.
>
> This might be more complicated. Looking at "them"
> can significantly change them.

They are still causally conneceted to me, and I to them

>They might also be an
> abstraction.

Why ? Why should two-way causality imply anstractness ?

> They can hardly be "objects" in the common
> sense of the word.

Why ? all you are saying is that they kick back.

> >> Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother?
> >> :-)
> >
> >> You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does
> >> not (completely) appear as such to everybody.
> >
> > The Devil is in the details. I await mathematical-monist accounts of
> > consciousness, causality and time.
>
> Don't be so impatient. Mankind has been awaiting for
> thousands of years an account of how living beings can
> have appeared in an inert world and though the account
> is now about a century and a half old it still did not
> make it to a significant portion of mankind (if not
> the majority).

Switching to a maths-only ontology does not necessarily make that any
easier.

> I am also awaiting for a physical-monist account of how
> consciousness can arise in living beings. This might
> take a few centuries to come. What is astounding is that
> it could emerge just through matter activity. Going from
> matter to consciousness is the hardest part for me. Once
> given, going from mathematics to physics is a fascinating
> idea but it does not make more or less mysterious the
> emergence of consciousness.

IMO the difficulties about consciousness arise from the subjectivty
or qualia, which arises from the icommunciability of qualia, which is
really the incommunicability of qualia **in mathematical terms**.

Admitting that there a basically non-mathematical elements in
nature allows us to identify qualia with those aspects, and gets us
off the hook of explaining them mathematically.

> Causality and time in a physical-monist view do not appear
> so mysterious to me.

So you understand causality and time ?

> It does not appear more mysterious
> in a mathematical-monist view.

But everybody thinks of the mathemaical realm as timeless!

> I once suggested that
> what could make our universe special and "exist more"
> than others is that it can be *chosen* among a set of
> universe following the same set of rules by adding one
> specific rule that would specify that the block universe
> (ie seen as a spatiotemporal object) is the one which
> is as "more ordered on one (temporal) side than on the
> other" as possible.

So there are arbitrary axioms in this mathematical world-view ?

And speaking of a block-universe is not explaining time ,
it is denying it !

> This is all we need to explain
> causality and time (and this is my fifth speculation).
> 
> Georges.


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