Georges Quénot wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Georges Quénot wrote: > > > >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > >>> Georges Quenot wrote: > >>> > >>>> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the > >>>> other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what > >>>> I called a dualist view. > >>> Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. > >>> Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical > >>> realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. > >> This *splits* "things" into "realness" and "abstractedness". > > > > No abstract "objects" aren't real things at all. > > Well... I am not sure I should insist. I do not want to > force you to believe or consider something you are not > willing to believe or consider. > > The question is not whether they are real things or not. > It is whether they are things or not.
They are not. The King of France is not a person. > Once they are things, > you have to decide how many types of things there must be. > > You might well feel otherwise but, for me, *they are not > nothing*. > > Just tell me: do you consider "natural numbers" as something, > as nothing, as "something" that would neither be something > nor nothing, or as "anything else" (please explain)? I consider them as concepts , as the intentional objects of neural activity. Of course intentional objects are not real things -- things are not brought into existence by thinking about them. > Please > answer without considering whether they are "real" or not, > just whether thet are something, nothing, ... *Then* we can > discuss *which type of* "thing" (or whatever) they might be. > > > There is only > > one kind of existing thing, ie real, physical things. > > You should clarify: do you mean existing, real or physical? > Which is which and on which ground which is a specific of > (or identical to) which? How do you define any of them? It think they all mean the same as each other, i.e. causally connected to me. > >> It postulates "material substance" > > > > yes, but only material substance. Hence it is monism, not dualism. > > No, this is "material substance" besides "abstract objetcs". Not if abstract "objects" do not really exist at all. > You do split things between "material" and "immaterial". I do not split existing things. > >> just as classical dualism > >> postulates a "spiritual substance" > > > > as well as a material substance. > > Yes and you do oppose material (real) things to immaterial > (abstract) ones. I oppose existence to non-existence. However, existence is not sub-divided into two realms. > >> (and just as once vitalism > >> postulated a "living substance"). > >> > >> Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean > >> bt "real" except by a tautology or via a reference to common > >> sense that no longer appears to be consensual. > > > > I am not sure what you mean by "non-consensual". Everyone believes > > that sticks and stones and what they had for breakfast are real. > > Not everyone believe that and that is not a joke. But the > main point is that not everybody gives the same meaning to > "real". I guarantee you that there are people (including > me) that do not feel things as you do in this matters (not > to say that something must be wrong either way, only that > several distinct and incompatible views actually coexist). Even people who think numbers are real do not think they are real in the same sense as their breakfast. > >>>> Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that > >>>> when saying "This has to be saying simply that the multiverse > >>>> IS a mathematical object." Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends > >>>> the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while > >>>> when saying "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed > >>>> to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract." > >>> Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you > >>> ever seen the number 3? > >> Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron? > > > > They can be detected by apropriate instrumentation. > > This might be more complicated. Looking at "them" > can significantly change them. They are still causally conneceted to me, and I to them >They might also be an > abstraction. Why ? Why should two-way causality imply anstractness ? > They can hardly be "objects" in the common > sense of the word. Why ? all you are saying is that they kick back. > >> Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother? > >> :-) > > > >> You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does > >> not (completely) appear as such to everybody. > > > > The Devil is in the details. I await mathematical-monist accounts of > > consciousness, causality and time. > > Don't be so impatient. Mankind has been awaiting for > thousands of years an account of how living beings can > have appeared in an inert world and though the account > is now about a century and a half old it still did not > make it to a significant portion of mankind (if not > the majority). Switching to a maths-only ontology does not necessarily make that any easier. > I am also awaiting for a physical-monist account of how > consciousness can arise in living beings. This might > take a few centuries to come. What is astounding is that > it could emerge just through matter activity. Going from > matter to consciousness is the hardest part for me. Once > given, going from mathematics to physics is a fascinating > idea but it does not make more or less mysterious the > emergence of consciousness. IMO the difficulties about consciousness arise from the subjectivty or qualia, which arises from the icommunciability of qualia, which is really the incommunicability of qualia **in mathematical terms**. Admitting that there a basically non-mathematical elements in nature allows us to identify qualia with those aspects, and gets us off the hook of explaining them mathematically. > Causality and time in a physical-monist view do not appear > so mysterious to me. So you understand causality and time ? > It does not appear more mysterious > in a mathematical-monist view. But everybody thinks of the mathemaical realm as timeless! > I once suggested that > what could make our universe special and "exist more" > than others is that it can be *chosen* among a set of > universe following the same set of rules by adding one > specific rule that would specify that the block universe > (ie seen as a spatiotemporal object) is the one which > is as "more ordered on one (temporal) side than on the > other" as possible. So there are arbitrary axioms in this mathematical world-view ? And speaking of a block-universe is not explaining time , it is denying it ! > This is all we need to explain > causality and time (and this is my fifth speculation). > > Georges. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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