# Re: Fw: Numbers

Danny and Russell:

--- danny mayes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I may accept your bootstrapping argument,...<

which Russell formulated like this (brief excerpt,
sorry Russell, if I left out the essence):

>>" ...What I'm tryng to say here is that the
description is a complete specification of a conscious
being, when interpreted (observed) by the conscious
being. There may have been an initial interpreter
(conscious or not) to bootstrap the original
conscious being...."<<

Here I feel as 'Conscious being No1' a DESCRIPTION of
it while 'Conscious being No2' is a regular computer
as used in 2006 by us. - I make no point in arguing if
a computer is conscious, just raise the question
whether a description IS INDEED a 'being' or just a
description of it?
Furthermore I feel the missing active FACTOR - the
working computer with a driving force and switched ON,
which 'interprets' (applies in its software) the
description - to apply it.

A description does nothing. Just as a blueprint (see
the faulty argument in Intelligent DESIGN which needs
an unnamed(!) factor to implement it).
A 'compiler' compiles only when you add the juice to
drive it. Design, software, hardware DO nothing by
themselves.

Second part:

Plenitude as described for MWI is one version. I wrote
another version in my (what I call) "narrative" and
that is the source of any MWI or universes for that
matter. Something close to what Rainer Zimmermann
(1998) called "Pre-Geometric". I identified it as the
unlimited everything in infinite invariant dynamic
symmetry about which (as I postulated) we have no
further information. It invariably forms identifiable
segments by dynamically assorting similar qualia to
one another, a timelessly dissipating fault in the
infinite invariance, what we call "universes".
Unrestrictied in qualia and numbers, ours developing a
time-space idea
which in the inside view shows extension and duration.

The stress for dissipation - again in the inside view
- is considered a kind of 'energy' - so well
misunderstood by the physical sciences in their model.

All I tried to illustrate is 'another view' without
any claim of truth.

John Mikes
------------------------

[Danny]:
> Russell,
>
> Thats a good summary.  However, my issue with your
> conclusion is this:
> even if I accept that a  "machine" or a "prime
> mover" is not necessary,
> such explanations are still part of the plenitude
> and therefore part of
> reality.  So if everything is reducible to math or
> information, even if
> you are correct that our reality can exist
> independent of these
> third-party explanations, such explanations still
> exist as part of the
> totality of everything that can exist.  What this
> would mean to me is
> that the reality I experience may occur naturally as
> a consequence of
> the logical bootstrapping you describe, but it would
> also be occuring
> through any number of artificial creations at the
> same time.  These
> realities overlap and it would be meaningless for me
> to try and say
> whether the reality I am experiencing now is one or
> the other- it is both.
>
> If you accept MWI or the plenitude, there are really
> only a few ways to
> avoid the above argument.  First, you could argue
> that our reality is
> not reducible to computations or math or
> information, and therefore it
> is not possible to artificially create our reality.
> Obviously, you and
> Marchal do not make this argument.  Second, you
> could argue that the
> creation of our universe requires some kind of
> infinite computation, and
> therefore the ability to artificially create it will
> forever lie beyond
> the means of intelligent beings.  However, I have
> always believed there
> are a number of problems with this argument, which
> I'll avoid right
> now.  Third, I guess you could argue that the
> reproduction of our
> universe to the point of emulation may require some
> kind of knowledge
> that would never be obtainable.  Again, if you
> accept that everything is
> reducible to math, then everything should be
> ultimately understandable
> at least in theory.
>
> I may accept your bootstrapping argument, but the
> plenitude is going to
> also logically bootstrap other creations, such a
> Tiplers Omega Point,
> into existence which my reality is a subroutine of.
> The fact is our
> reality is by and large pretty simple to describe.
> I'm thinking we are
> a pretty run of the mill program in the plenitude...
>
> Danny
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >This is the way I put the argument in my upcoming
> book. You can also
> >read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno
> Marchal's SANE04
> >paper.
> >
> >\item That a description logically capable of
> observing itself is
> >  enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me
> speak to this by
> >  means of an example: The C programming language
> is a popular
> >  language for computer applications.  To convert a
> program written in
> >  C into machine instructions that can execute on
> the computer, one
> >  uses another program called a compiler. Many C
> compilers are
> >  available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C
> compiler, or gcc. Gcc
> >  is itself a C language program, you can download
> the program source
> >  code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it
> yourself, if you
> >  already have a working C compiler. Once you have
> compiled gcc, you
> >  can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has
> bootstrapped itself
> >  onto your computer, and all references to any
> preexisting compiler
> >  forgotten.
> >
> >  What I'm tryng to say here is that the
> description is a complete
> >  specification of a conscious being, when
> interpreted (observed) by
> >  the conscious being. There may have been an
> initial interpreter
> >  (conscious or not) to bootstrap the original
> conscious being. It
> >  matters not which interpreter it is --- any
> suitable one will do. If
> >  {\em computationalism} \S\ref{computationalism}
> is correct, any
> >  universal Turing machine will suffice. In fact
> since the 3rd person
> >  world has to be a timeless {\em ideal} structure,
> it is not
> >  necessary to actually run the initial
> interpreter. The logical
> >  possibility of a conscious observer being able to
> instantiate itself
> >  is sufficient in a timeless Plenitude of all
> possibilities. Thus we
> >  close the ontology of the bitstring Plenitude,
> and find an answer
> >  to Stephen Hawking's question What breathes
> fire into the
> >  equations''\cite[p. 174]{Hawking88}. Paraphrasing
> the words of
> >  Pierre-Simon Laplace to Napoleon Bonaparte, we
> have no need of a
> >  hypothesis of a concrete reality\cite{Marchal98}.
> >
> >
> >I appreciate that some can never do this
> ontological closure, that for
> >them there must always be a machine somewhere doing
> the running. This
> >is reminiscient of those people for whom there must
> be a prime mover
> >to start the universe off.
> >
> >I know that Bruno says he's eliminated the
> "extravagent hypothesis",
> >but really I think he's shown that it is
> unnecessary, and can be pared
> >away by Occam's razor, not that it is
> >
> >Cheers
> >
> >On Sat, Mar 18, 2006 at 10:37:51PM -0800, Norman
> Samish wrote:
> >
> >
> >>Are you saying that a tape of infinite length,
> with infinite digits, is not
> >>Turing emulable?
> >>
> >>I don't understand how the 'compiler theorem'
> makes a 'concrete' machine
> >>unnecessary.  I agree that the tape can contain an
> encoding of the Turing
> >>machine - as well as anything else that's
> describable.
> >>
> >>Nevertheless, it seems to me there has to be a
> 'concrete' machine executing
> >>the tape, irrespective of the contents of the
> tape.
> >>
> >>Norman
> >>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >>
> >>----- Original Message -----
> >>From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >>Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:37 PM
> >>Subject: Re: Fw: Numbers
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>But the tape can also hold an encoding of the
> Turing machine to perform the
> >>interpretation. This is the essence of the
> "compiler theorem". One can
> >>simply iterate this process such that there is no
> "concrete" machine
> >>interpreting the tape. I think this is another way
> of putting the UDA.
> >>
> >>Cheers
> >>
> >>
> >>On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 01:31:22PM -0800, Norman
> Samish wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >>>
>
=== message truncated ===

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