Sometimes I really don't understand how some people, in the literature, 
did not see what I have seen, and I begin to harbor doubt on my work.
The most famous case was the case of Einstein and Godel, who met at 
Princeton, but seems not having try to really understand each other on 
some of the most fundamental question. Eventually I discovered that 
Einstein was a quasi-"conventionalist" in math, and this could explain 
his lack of interest in logic and in Godel's work.

A more vexing case was the case of Smullyan. Indeed all his technical, 
recreative or not, books on logic turn around Godel's theorems. But 
Smullyan wrote also books on religious/theological (in a wide sense). 
Still he never tried to connect them. I am thinking about his books 
"The Tao is Silent", "5000 BC", and "Who knows".

I have recently discovered that Smullyan never talk on Church's thesis. 
He does not seem aware of the "simple" proof of Godel's incompleteness 
which follows almost directly from Church's thesis, nor does he use it 
to motivate some link between computer science and mathematical logic. 
In particular his book "Forever Undecided", although mentioning two 
times the "artificial intelligence" motivation is rather striking in 
that respect: indeed his chapter "the heart of the matter" is almost 
presented without motivation. He presents his "Godelized Universe" like 
if it was just a new kind of game or puzzle, not really more motivated 
than the *fairy* Knight-Knave Island.

So, there is a sort of missing paragraph or section before the "heart 
of the matter", and I am working on it, so that "Forever Undecided" 
could be use more easily by those interested in the comp reversal.

But then, what I got makes a bridge between his work on Godel's 
incompleteness and his philo/theo-logical writings, and I feel now 
sufficiently confident in that link to recommend those books. They does 
not present a metaphysical system, unlike Plotinus, but present rather 
many interesting short reasonings in the religious field, arguably 
converging toward Plotinus, notably through his comment on "cosmic 
consciousness" in the second part of "Who knows".

I will, soon or later, expand a little bit on all this, especially on 
the importance, not just for comp, but for theoretical computer 
science, of Church's thesis. Meanwhile you could still study the 24 
first sections of the FU book, i.e. until page 206. Particularly 
interesting for the "consciousness thread" is the succession of more 
and more self-aware sort of reasoners (type 1, type 1*, type 2, type 3, 
type 4) in his chapter "logicians who reason about themselves" (page 
89) all that driven toward the "well known" type G). My approach to 
consciousness adds "inductive inference ability", with the automated 
(unconscious) bets on personal self-consistency, or of any proposition 
belonging to the corona G* \minus G. We can come back on this later.

To be sure, all this is not necessary for the understanding of the UDA 
reversal argument, but it is necessary for the translation of that 
argument in the language of an introspective universal machine, and 
this is necessary for the actual derivation of the comp "propositional 
physics" (and then for  its comparison with quantum logic).


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