peterdjones wrote:
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> That too can be discussed. It is not so sure that there
>> exist a set of equations of which a HP universe would
>> be a solution, especially if this universe must also
>> include a counterpart of me.
> As  I have pointed out, there is bound to be an equation to which
> any given number is the solution.
>>> -- in a broad sense of "I".
>> This "I in a broad sense" does not make sense to me
>> If "I" fork, there will be two new "I" that will each
>> have their common (old) memories and their different
>> (new) ones. There will not be a single "I" that will
>> have the new memories of both.
> But both 'I's" will identify **themselves** as Georges Quenot.
>> Even if we admit both statements above, I don't see any
>> problem with the idea that some of the forked "I" will
>> witness a HP universe.
> It's not observed !
>> Finally, I don't see what mathematical monism has to
>> do with that. The problem would be the same if one
>> had to explain why HP universes don't physically exist
>> (as being equally mathematically possible as ours).
> It's not the same problem, because the whole point
> of physical existence is that not all logical
> possibilities are instantiated.
> (To put it another way: the point is to explain
> experience. Physicalism explains non-experience
> of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals
> to ad-hoc hypotheses about non-interaction. All explanations
> have to end somewhere. The question is how many
> unexplained assumptions there are). 

OK. The idea of "mathematical monism" does not make sense
for you while it does for me. I have absolutely no problem
with that. I am not a proselyte.


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