Le 24-mars-06, à 17:19, 1Z a écrit :

> A materialist cannot possible be worse off in explaining mind that
>  a Mathematical Monist, sice he has at least one extra ingredient to
> play with.
> He is not obliged to deny that mind has anythign to do with
> computation, but
> when he hits problems he can appeal to matter itself -- for instance
> hypothesising
> that something about the specific physics/chemistry of the brain
> explains qualia.

But physics/chemistry are turing emulable, and by UDA, cannot solve the 
At least comp explmain why anything turing emulable can know non 
turing-emulable truth about herself. Comp gives a big role to  the 
uncomputable, given that the first person must predict its experience 
on some limit of all computational process, and that limit can be shown 
to be non turing emulable.



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