Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 24-mars-06, à 17:19, 1Z a écrit :
> > A materialist cannot possible be worse off in explaining mind that
> >  a Mathematical Monist, sice he has at least one extra ingredient to
> > play with.
> > He is not obliged to deny that mind has anythign to do with
> > computation, but
> > when he hits problems he can appeal to matter itself -- for instance
> > hypothesising
> > that something about the specific physics/chemistry of the brain
> > explains qualia.
> >
> But physics/chemistry are turing emulable,

that is debatable.

> and by UDA, cannot solve the
> problems.

Arguments form computer science can only be relevant to physics
or chemistry if you regard them as mathematical abstractions. The
Searlian point is that there is something about the actual, concrete
non-abstract existence/occurence of real physical processes that
explains the hard problems (IOW, "physics" in the sense of "territory",
not "map").

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