peterdjones wrote:
> [...]
> (To put it another way: the point is to explain
> experience. Physicalism explains non-experience
> of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals
> to ad-hoc hypotheses about non-interaction. All explanations
> have to end somewhere. The question is how many
> unexplained assumptions there are). 

I would like to understand your view. How do *you* solve
the "HP universe" problem? In your view of things, amongst
all the mathematical objects to which a universe could be
isomorphic to, *what* does make only one (or a few) "exist"
or "be real" or "be physical" or "be instanciated" and all
others not?

Also, you reject "mathematical monism" as not making sense
for you but what about the ohter conjectures I mentionned?
Do you find that "physical monism" ("mind emerges from
matter activity"), "mathematical realism" ("mathematical
objects exist by themselves") and "Tegmark's hypothesis"
("our universe is isomorphic to a mathematical object",
though Tegmark might no be the first to propose the idea)
make sense? Have some chance of being true?


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