Le 24-mars-06, à 17:19, 1Z a écrit :

> > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Le 18-mars-06, à 16:00, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : >> >>> If every mathematical structure exists , then mathematical structures >>> consisting >>> of a counterpart of me plus a "Harry Potter" universe exist. Yet this >>> is not >>> observed. Of course that might be coincidence. >> >> >> No it can't. This what the computationalist (or weaker) must explain. >> This is mainly what the list is all about. >> >> Hal Finney, like my oldest attempts, try to explain the lack of Harry >> Potter or white flying bunnies, by the abonormal huge rate of >> computations needed to sustain such "illusions" in a coherent way. >> My critics in a nutshell is that such an explanation cannot work once >> we make explicit the first and third person description. The first >> person, being unable to know the UD's delays of computations, cannot >> distinguish a high variety of little and less little programs, so that >> Hal Finney sort of explanation is incomplete (at best). My way of >> tackling the problem consists in translating the UDA in the language >> of >> a universal machine. Thanks to incompleteness this makes sense, and we >> eventually are lead to an arithmetical interpretation of the Platonist >> theories of everything, which observable consequences, like quantum >> logic, many-worlds interfering in a wavy fashion, etc. >> >> Peter, what are your postulates? I think you are postulating an >> aristotelian stuffy universe. > > Yes. If we use matter to answer the question "what is it about > mathematical structure > A that explains it's existence, rather than mathematical stucture B", > we immediately > arrive at a *definition* of matter which is non-solipsistic. > >> Are you postulating comp? > > I am fairly lukewarm about comp. I certainly wouldn't use it to > expalin anythig else. What we can be sure of is that > 1) we exist > 2) we are conscious > 3) there is some sort of external world > 4) there is some phenomenon of time. I agree with the four point. But I don't believe in any (single or multiple) stuffy universe. Nor do I believe physics can stay the fundamental science once we postulate comp. It is not a matter of choice but of reasoning and taking our hypothesis seriously. We just cannot distinguish material, virtual, and purely arithmetical realities when we quantify the first person indeterminacy. See my url and this list for more information. Of course, you are free to abandon comp if you assume physicalism. (But then this moves will not help you because the reasoning goes through with considerable weakening of comp). > > These are all quite problematical for Mathematical Monism; > assuming another problematical hypothesis, COMP, and using > it to deny some or all of (1) to (4) is cart-bfore-the-horse. Arguments > should start with what you can be sure of. Sure, but comp is ok with the four. Of course the external reality can be just arithmetical truth. > >> If yes, you are >> in difficulties (cf UDA), if not, what is your theory of mind? > > A materialist cannot possible be worse off in explaining mind that > a Mathematical Monist, sice he has at least one extra ingredient to > play with. Study the UDA. It is a reasoning which show you are precisely wrong here. If you want I can explain it step by step. UDA shows that "weak materialism" (the existence of some primitive stuff) and computationalism (or just self-referential correctness) are epistemologically untenable simultaneously. If you want we can proceed step by step (could help some others). > He is not obliged to deny that mind has anythign to do with > computation, but > when he hits problems he can appeal to matter itself -- for instance > hypothesising > that something about the specific physics/chemistry of the brain > explains qualia. But he should first explain what he means by matter, and then qualia and how it relates it. If he assumes comp he will fail, by UDA. bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---