Georges, Peter:

Arriving at a consistent and reasonable-sounding theory of personal identity 
in the multiverse is difficult, to say the least. Some list members in the 
past have argued that all copies of a person have an equal claim to that 
person's identity, so that we should feel responsible for the actions of 
even those parallel copies whose memories we will never share. I object to 
this on the grounds that it is unfair (it's not my fault if a parallel copy 
commits a crime, nor do I benefit in any way if a parallel copy has a 
rewarding experience), and also because any criterion for how similar two 
individuals have to be in order to be considered copies is ultimately 
arbitrary. I think the clearest way to talk about these matters is to 
relinquish the notion that two copies could be the "same person" in any 
objective or absolute sense. This naturally leads to the smallest possible 
unit of personhood, delimited in time, space and multiverse, and loosely 
analogous to the (somewhat controvesial) observer moment or observer-moment. 
In other words, if you say that it was Joe Bloggs at a specific time, place 
and multiverse branch who did the murder, there can be no argument about the 
identity of the accused. But if you then ask if this is the same Joe Bloggs 
a day or a year before or after the murder, the old philosophical arguments 
about personal identity all arise, and we have to answer that *by 
convention*, it is, and *by convention*, the older Joe Bloggs in those 
multiverse branches where he recalls committing the crime, but not the 
younger Joe Bloggs, and not the older Joe Bloggs in those multiverse 
branches where (in the absence of a memory disorder) he does not recall 
committing the crime, deserves to be punished.

Stathis Papaioannou

> >
> > Georges Quenot wrote:
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> >>> Georges Quenot wrote:
> >>>> If you are a being that have never observed magical events
> >>>> any duplicate of you "will" never have observed any magical
> >>>> event either (otherwise you would differ and no longer be
> >>>> true duplicates).
> >>> That doesn't work the other way round. A duplicate of me up to
> >>> 16:51 GMT 20 mar 2006 could  suddenly start observing them.
> >> Your duplicate will know. Not You. And he will no longer
> >> be your duplicate.
> >
> > I am, conventionally, the same person as my previous selves.
> > I have their memories.
>No. You may have lost some of them, acquired some new
>ones and still share most of them (if the previous self
>you consider is not too far in the past). In some sense,
>you are the same person and in some sense you are a
>different person.
> > My duplicate will have my memories.
>Your duplicate will have the same memories as you. This
>is not the same thing. Once your duplicate experience
>something different of what you do, his acquired (and
>possibly his lost) memories will differ from yours. He
>will still share most of your previous common memories
>but he will not know your new ones and you will not
>know his new ones. If he evenutally encoutered Harry
>Potter and you do not, whatever memories you shared
>before, you will not share these ones.
> > Or are you saying that I am not the same person as my
> > previous selves ?
>As I said above, in some sense, you are the same person
>and in some sense you are a different person. I feel I
>am the same person as I was 25 years ago and meanwhile
>I also feel very different. Maybe you also experienced
>something similar.

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